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Unitariness and Independence:
Solicitor General Control over
Independent Agency Litigation
Neal Devinst
With a few exceptions, the Solicitor General controls all aspects of
independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court. Solicitor General
control of Supreme Court litigation creates a tension between independent
agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority. On the one hand,
Solicitor General control provides the United States with a unitary voice
before the Supreme Court, and provides the Court with a trustworthy litigator to explicate the government's position. On the other hand, such control
may undermine the autonomy of independent agency decisionmaking. In
this Article, the author argues for a hybrid model of independent agency
litigation in the Supreme Court: so long as there are independent agencies,
Congress should allow independent agency self-representation whenever
the Solicitor General is unwilling to advocate the agency's interests. Thus,
when disagreements between the Solicitor General and an independent
agency are irreconcilable, the independent agency should be allowed to go
its own way. The author concludes by connecting the issue of Solicitor
General-independent agency relations to the larger debate over the unitary
executive, arguing that the unitary executive is the only theory which supports Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation. In other
Copyright © 1994 California Law Review, Inc.
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Georgetown University; J.D. 1982, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Dawn Darkes, Brook Edinger,
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their time and insights with me; and to participants at an Eruocy Law School faculty workshop,
participants at the Executive Branch Interpretation Symposium at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law, and participants at an American Association of Law Schools Constitutional Law Workshop at the
University of Michigan School of Law both for enduring presentations of an earlier version of this paper
and for offering countless insights on Solicitor General advocacy.
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words, to the extent that there is dissatisfaction with limiting Solicitor
General control of Supreme Court litigation, that dissatisfaction speaks to
the elimination of independent agency authority to reach decisions at odds
with the executive.
lNrR.ODUCTION AND OVERVIEW

Policymaking by government officials who cannot be removed by the
President appears to be a secure fixture in the modern administrative state.
Reagan and Bush Administration efforts to subordinate independent agency
heads to a unitary executive have clearly failed. 1 In contrast to such efforts,
the Clinton Administration refuses to wave the banner of unitariness. 2
While much of the war over unitariness appears over, unitarinessindependence battles will nonetheless persist. This Article will focus on
one of these battles, namely the battle for independent agency representation before the United States Supreme Court.
An essential attribute of independent agency autonomy is an agency's •
power to manage its own litigation and to represent itself in court. Before
the Supreme Court, however, the Solictor General, with some notable
exceptions, controls all aspects of independent agency litigation, including
the power to seek certiorari. The exercise of such control, as one Solicitor
General recognized, "to some extent curtail[s]" agency freedom "[d]espite
the self-restraint which most Solicitors General exercise."3
This Article examines implications of the tension between independent
agency freedom and the Solicitor General's authority to control independent
agency litigation. Through an examination of court filings, legislative hearings, and approximately fifty personal interviews with current and former
officials of various independent agencies (commissioners, general counsel,
and line attorneys),4 the Department of Justice (political appointees and
1. See generally Neal Devins, Tempest in an Envelope: Reflections on the Bush White House's
Failed Takeover of the U.S. Postal Service, 41 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming April 1994); Geoffrey P.
Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Separation of Powers in the Reagan Era, 51 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 401 (1989); Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the lAw, IS CARDOZO L. REv. 21
(1993).
2. See Bill Clinton and Administrative lAw, ADMIN. L. NEws (ABNSection of Administmtivc
Law and Regulatory Practice), Fall 1992, at I, 9.
3. Robert L. Stern, The Solicitor General's Office and Administrative Agency Litigation, 46
A.B.A. J. 154, 218 (1960). Stern served as Acting Solicitor General from 1952-1954. ld. at 156.
4. Independent agency officials interviewed include the following: Glen Robinson, Former
Commissioner, Federal Communications Commission (Aug. 20, 1992); Paul Gonson, Solicitor,
Securities and Exchange Commission (Sept. 2, 1992); Mark Fowler, Former Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission (Sept. 3, 1992); Dan Goelzer, Former General Counsel, Securities and
Exchange Commission (Sept. 3, 1992); Jeff Lubbers, Research Director, Administmtive Conference of
the United States (Sept. 3, 1992); Daniel Armstrong, Associate General Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission (Sept. 4, 1992); Bruce Fein, Former General Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission (Sept. 9, 1992); Diane Kilory, Former General Counsel, Federal
Communications Commission (Sept. 10, 1992); Charles Shanor, Former General Counsel, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (Sept. 16, 1992); Paul Brenner, Attorney, Equal Employment
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careerists within the Solicitor General's office, the Office of Legal Counsel,
and the Attorney General's office),5 and congressional committees (counsel
and staffers), 6 this Article analyzes the complex interactions between
independent agencies and the Solicitor General and proposes changes in the
basic nature of those interactions. The interactions extend well beyond the
resolution of litigation strategy disputes. They also speak to an independent
agency's understanding of its freedom from Executive Branch control and
the Solicitor General's perception of whose interests he should represent
before the Supreme Court.
The division of responsibility between independent agencies and the
Solicitor General raises the spectre of a Solicitor General power grab of
independent agency prerogatives. Despite the tension inherent in this relationship, independent agency officials and attorneys in the Solicitor
General's office seem relatively content with the present arrangement.
Agency officials tend to emphasize the benefits of the relationship with the
Solicitor General attorneys: skillful representation; their familiarity with
the Court; and their respect for, if not deference toward, agency interests.
In exchange for these benefits, most agencies are willing to have their priorities occasionally undervalued.
Solicitor General attorneys likewise emphasize the quality of their representation. Moreover, most of these attorneys perceive that the Solicitor
General provides a unitary voice for the United States before the Supreme
Opportunity Commission (Sept 22, 1992); Johnny J. Butler, Former Acting General Counsel, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (Sept. 22, 1992); Peter Pitch, Former Chief of Staff, Federal
Communications Commission (Sept. 22, 1992); Vince Blackwood, Attorney, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (Sept 23, 1992); Jerry Cummings, Associate General Counsel, Federal Trade
Commission (Oct. 8, 1992); Ernie Eisenstadt, Associate General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission
(Oct. 8, 1992); Calvin Collier, Former Chairman and Former General Counsel, Federal Trade
Commission (Oct. 9, 1992); Rosemary Collyer, Former General Counsel, National Labor Relations
Board (Jan. 18, 1993); Norton Come, Head of National Labor Relatlons Board Supreme Court Litigation
Division (Jan. 18, 1993). Through my work as a consultant to the U.S. Postal Service, I have also
spoken with numerous agency officials and members of the Postal Service's Board of Governors about
Department of Justice control of independent agency litigation.
5. Department of Justice officials interviewed include the following: Ken Geller, Former Deputy
Solicitor General (Sept 2, 1992); Carter Phillips, Former Assistant to the Solicitor General (Sept. 3,
1992); Bruce Fein, Former Assistant to the Attorney General (Sept. 9, 1992); Douglas Kmiec, Former
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Sept. 10, 1992); Tom Merrill, Former Deputy
Solicitor General (Sept. 16, 1992); Lawrence Wallace, Deputy Solicitor General (Sept. 22, 1992); Terry
Eastland, Former Assistant to the Attorney General (Sept. 23, 1992); John McGinnis, Former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (Sept. 23, 1992); Drew Days, Former Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division (Sept. 24, 1992); Mike Carvin, Former Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, Civil Rights Division (Oct. 14, 1992).
6. Congressional interviews include the following: Toni Cook, Staff Member-Communications,
Senate Commerce Committee (June 2, 1992); Lisa Gursky, Telecommunications Policy Analyst, House
Telecommunications Subcommittee (June 2, 1992); Gina Keeny, Staff Member-Communications,
Senate Commerce Committee (June 9, 1992); Colin Crowell, Staff Member, House Telecommunications
Subcommittee (Sept 25, 1992); Louis Fisher, Senior Specialist in Government, Congressional Research
Service (Sept. 30, 1992); Mort Rosenberg, Senior Specialist in Law, Congressional Research Service
(Sept 30, 1992).

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 257 1994

CAliFORNIA LAW REVIEW

258

[Vol. 82:255

Court and that this voice serves both the government and the Court. The
government is served by having its legal arguments skillfully coordinated;
the Court is served by having a trustworthy litigator explicate the government's position and screen agency litigation for cases that are likely to meet
the Court's standards for granting certiorari.
While somewhat awkward, the current system does allow for a reasonable degree of cooperation between independent agencies and the Solicitor
General. Independent agencies typically have the final say in litigation
until a case reaches the Supreme Court. Moreover, the Solicitor General
usually defends the agency's position when a case is before the Supreme
Court. When he does not, the agency is often allowed to present its views
through separate filings. Indeed, even when the Solicitor General refuses to
seek certiorari at an independent agency's behest, the agency will typically
have the opportunity to relitigate the issue in another case. In such cases,
Supreme Court adjudication is merely delayed, not foreclosed.
The contentment that seemingly characterizes Solicitor Generalindependent agency relations is somewhat surprising given the debate in
recent years concerning the allegiance the Solicitor General owes the
Executive Branch. Catalyzed by Solicitor General Charles Fried's July
1985 "abortion brief'7 calling for the overturning of Roe v. Wade, 8 this
debate pits advocates of an independent Solicitor General against proponents of a unitary Department of Justice. 9 This controversy, however, has
not affected independent agency attitudes nor has it prompted Congress to
reconsider Solicitor General control over independent agency litigation.
Unfortunately, contentment with the current arrangement disguises its
shortcomings. The claim that conflict between the Solicitor General and
independent agencies rarely surfaces is misleading. On an agency-byagency basis, most conflicts are worked out. Nonetheless, the volume of
public disputes between the Solicitor General and independent agencies is
7. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants, Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No. 84495). Fried served as
Solicitor General from 1985-1989. The politics surrounding this brief are discussed in LINCOLN
CAPLAN, THE TENTH JusnCE: THE SoucrroR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAw 135-54 (1987) nnd in
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAw: ARGUING THE REAGAN REvoLunoN-A FJRSTIIAND AccouNT 33-35
(1991). For a critique of Fried's participation in abortion cases, see Joshua I. Schwartz, The President's
Lawyer as Frie(n)d, 60 Goo. WASH. L. REv. 1081, 1119-24 (1992) (reviewing FRIED, supra).
8.
9.

410

u.s. 113 (1973).

Compare, e.g., CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 255-77 (arguing that the Reagan Administration's
aggressive pursuit of its agenda compromised the Solicitor General's traditional independence and its
special relationship with the Supreme Court) with John 0. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The
Solicitor General's Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L. REv. 799, 801-09
(1992) (reviewing FRIED, supra note 7) (describing the Solicitor General as a duty-bound subordinate of
the White House) and Roger Clegg, The Thirty-Fifth Law Clerk, 1987 DuKE LJ. 964 (reviewing
CAPLAN, supra note 7) (critiquing Coplan's view that the Solictor General should ben servant of the
Court and his view that the Reagan Administration eroded the Solicitor General's independence). See
generally Symposium, The Role and Function of the United States Solicitor General, 21 Lov. L.A. L.
REv. 1047 (1988).
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far from insignificant. Substantive conflicts arise every year in cases
argued before the Court. It is atypical but not unusual to see a Solicitor
General brief that the affected agency refuses to join or an agency brief at
odds with the ''Brief for the United States." More significantly, the
Solicitor General will sometimes refuse to seek certiorari or will affirmatively oppose certiorari because he disagrees with an independent agency
on the merits.
Disputes are also understated because conflict resolution presupposes
that independent agencies are well served by forgoing the power to present
cases before the Supreme Court in order to benefit from the Solicitor
General's counsel. By not allowing the agency to make the certiorari petition decision itself, the present arrangement often gives the Solicitor
General the last word on judicial resolution of policy disputes between
independent agencies and the Executive Branch. 10 The Solicitor General's
power to trump independent agency desires and the conflict it creates are
the starting points for analyzing Solicitor General-independent agency
relations.
The current decisionmaking arrangement might make sense if the
Solicitor General were viewed as an independent advocate who, in the
words of Solicitor General Francis Biddle (1940-1941), is "responsible
neither to the man who appointed him nor to his immediate superior . . .
[and has] no master to serve except his country." 11 If the Solicitor General
had such autonomy, Executive Branch entities as well as independent agencies would give up control of Supreme Court litigation to an omniscient
"Celestial General." 12 However, like post-Watergate efforts to convert the
Department of Justice into an independent agency, 13 such Solicitor General
independence unconstitutionally infringes on the President's power to "take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.'*
10. On this point, see Susan M. Olson, Challenges to the Gatekeeper: The Debate over Federal
Litigating Authority, 68 JUDICATURE 70, 86 (1984) ("Centralized litigating authority means the choice of
the Attorney General [rather than the courts] .•. as the proper place for the resolution of such
[governmental] conflicts."); Robert L. Stern, "Inconsistency" in Government Litigation, 64 HAR.v. L.
REv. 759, 769 (1951) ("[D]etermination [of intragovernmental disputes] by the judiciary is often more
satisfactory than an effort by the Department of Justice to force its own views on the disagreeing agency
by refusing to present the agency's position to the courts.").
11.

FRANCIS

BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AtmlORITY 97-98 (1962).

12. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 171 (noting that "Celestial General," a nickname coined by
Justice Louis Brandeis, was "an emblem of the Solicitor General" until the onset of the Reagan
Administration).
13. See Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) [hereinafter

Politics Hearings].
14. U.S. CoNST. art. n, § 3. Specifically, by placing control of all federal legal policymaking
before the Supreme Court in an official outside of the Executive Branch, presidential authority would be
so severely undermined that the president would impermissibly be deprived of his authority to
"faithfully execute" the laws.
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In addition, this vision reflects little of the reality and limitations of
Solicitor General advocacy, including occasional efforts by the White
House and the Attorney General to circumscribe the Solicitor General's
authority. While he is "not the pamphleteer general," as Rex Lee (19811985) aptly observed, the Solicitor General serves ''the President's broader
agenda" through ''the special status that [he] enjoy[s]." 15 The Solicitor
General's "special status" derives neither from his independence nor from
his supposed role as an officer of the Court. His "special status" is a byproduct of an often brilliant juggling act, rooted in tradition and a desire to
maximize influence, which is responsive to the competing demands of the
White House, agencies and departments, and the Supreme Court. However,
the Solicitor General is the Executive Branch's advocate before the
Supreme Court, and his loyalty properly belongs to the Attorney General
and the President.
Solicitor General power over independent agencies would also make
sense if the government presented itself as a unitary concern before the
judiciary. But, for several reasons, this is not the case. First, independent
agencies often square off with each other and with the Department of
Justice in the lower federal courts. Congress authorizes this arrangement,
and federal judges seem untroubled by it. Second, Congress has granted
some agencies independent authority to litigate cases before the Supreme
Court free of Solicitor General control. In addition, the Solicitor General
occasionally aJlows independent agencies, as well as executive departments
and agencies, to file briefs opposing his views. Indeed, on rare occasions,
the Court has adjudicated lawsuits by independent agencies against the
United States. While the Court may not prefer this arrangement, it does not
stand in the way of such divided presentations.
For better or for worse, independent agencies are empowered to make
policy at odds with White House priorities. To allow an Executive Branch
official to control both the decision to seek certiorari and the arguments
presented before the Supreme Court is to risk that power. Congress, of
course, can solidify independent agency autonomy by extending independent agency litigating authority to Supreme Court matters. Alternatively,
Congress may prefer that independent agency officials not air their disputes
with each other and the Executive Branch in court. By making government
litigation the Department of Justice's exclusive domain, Congress could
nullify independent agency legal policymaking.
This Article will argue that so long as there are independent agencies,
Congress should expand independent agency litigating authority in most
instances. Legal policymaking is a critical feature of independent agency
decisionmaking; full control of litigating authority is, therefore, essential to
independent agency autonomy. That authority should extend to the
15. Rex E. Lee, Lawyering for the Government: Politics, Polemics & Principle, 47 OHIO ST. L.J.
595, 600 (1986).
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Supreme Court. At the same time, the Solicitor General should continue to
work with independent agency counsel, advising agencies on the "cert-worthiness" of cases and participating in cases where the Solicitor General and
the agency are of the same mind. When disagreements between the two are
irreconcilable, an independent agency should be allowed to go its own way.
The Solicitor General would not be harmed by this arrangement. In
most cases, the independent agency would cooperate with the Solicitor
General. When differences could not be reconciled, the Solicitor General
would avoid the awkward position of either frustrating agency interests by
not seeking certiorari or authorizing the agency to take a position at odds
with the "United States." Moreover, when an independent agency chose to
stake out its own position, the Solicitor General would be free to share his
views with the Court without the encumbrance of shooting his putative client in the foot.
Finally, the Court would not be burdened by this expansion of
independent agency litigating authority. It would continue to benefit from
the Solicitor General's certiorari recommendations and substantive arguments. Indeed, to ensure Solicitor General participation, Congress could
make the Solicitor General a statutory litigant in all government litigation
before the Supreme Court. The slight increase in dual filings that may
result should not bother the Court since dual filings are already a wellaccepted practice. The Court is sufficiently sophisticated to sort out the
varying interests of the Solicitor General and independent agencies.
This analysis perhaps begs the question of whether we should have
independent agencies. The more troubling one finds one part of the government opposing another part of the government in court, the more likely one
prefers independent agencies to be replaced by executive agencies, 16 and
conversely, the less troubling, the less likely. By examining the complexities of independent litigating authority, this Article provides some guidance
to the question of whether independent agencies should exist.
16. Congress, nonetheless, may specify that executive agencies control their own cases, rather
than having such control rest with the Department of Justice. Congress may also be able to authorize
executive agencies to bring suit against other parts of the Executive Branch. See generally Michael
Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 893 (1991) (arguing that disputes between executive agencies sometimes present justiciable
controversies and that standards for measuring the justiciability of executive agency disputes should be
the same as for disputes involving independent agencies). The range of such authority is subject to
question. See infra Part II.C.l. It is also unclear whether government attorneys have an ethical duty to
heed Attorney General desires. See Geoffery P. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics in a System of
Checks and Balances, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 1293, 1298 (1987) [hereinafter Miller, Government Lawyers'
Ethics] (supporting the premise that an agency attorney owes a general ethical duty to the Attorney
General but arguing that the primary ethical duty is owed to the officer with the power of decision over
an issue). However, it is clear that an individual who dislikes independent agencies is likely to prefer
centralized control of government litigation in the hands of the Attorney General. See, e.g., Geoffery P.
Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. Cr. REv. 41, 96-97 [hereinafter Miller, Independent Agencies]
(attacking independent agencies as "anomalous institution[s] created without regard to the basic
principle of separation of powers").
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The remainder of this Article will fill in the details of the argument
outlined above. Part I will describe the jerry-rigged structure that defines
the respective litigating authority of independent agencies and the
Department of Justice. Part II will examine the saliency of Solicitor
General control of governmental litigation. Specifically, the Solicitor
General's responsibility to the Executive Branch and the risk of significant
disputes between the Solicitor General and independent agencies suggest
that such control significantly limits independent agency autonomy. The
virtues of Solicitor General representation do not ameliorate these
problems; instead, these virtues speak to Solicitor General participation
in-not control of-independent agency litigation. Finally, Part ill will
connect the issue of Solicitor General-independent agency relations to the
larger debate over the unitary executive. Specifically, Part ill will argue
that the unitary executive is the only theory which truly supports Solicitor
General control of independent agency litigation.

I
GoVERNMENT ADvocAcY BEFORE THE SUPREME CouRT

The government does not always speak as a single voice before the
Supreme Court. Cabinet-level departments and executive agencies sometimes air their disputes with each other, Congress, and independent agencies
before the Supreme Court. Conflicts inevitably arise among these players.
Congress, especially during times of divided government, cannot reasonably expect the Executive Branch to defend vigorously all legislative priorities in court. Intramural disputes within the Executive Branch are also
commonplace. Department and executive agency heads, while appointed
and subject to removal by a "unitary" President, rarely fall in line uniformly
with White House attempts to coordinate a centralized vision of the
President's public policy objectivesP These individuals have different
visions of the social good, serve different constituency interests, and labor
under different oversight committees. Independent agencies are even more
prone to find themselves in the midst of conflict. Aside from facing varying constituency interests and oversight committee pressures, agency commissioners, who can only be fired for cause, are sometimes members of a
different political party than the President and are often appointed by the
sitting President's predecessor. 18
While the existence of conflicts and disputes is not surprising, the volume of intragovernmental disputes that are publicly aired before the federal
17. See Neal Devins, The Civil Rights Hydra, 89 MicH. L. REv. 1723, 1749-63 (1991) (reviewing
HuGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (1990)) (discussing political and institutional obstacles that
limit the President's ability to control agencies in seeking coordinated policy strategies).
18. For background discussion of intragovernmental constraints facing independent agencies, sec
PETER L. STRAuss, AN INrRooucnoN TO ADMINISTRATIVE JuSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 51-92
(1989); Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALB LJ. 451 (1979).
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courts, including the Supreme Court, is noteworthy. Through a combination of politics, comity, and statutory right, the government often appears as
a conglomeration of competing interests rather than a single, unified voice.
This is evident in the following passage from Carter Attorney General
Griffin Bell's oral argument in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill: 19
ATIORNEY GENERAL BELL: ...
In this unusual case, as Attorney General I agreed that the
Secretary of Interior could take a position opposite our position in
this Court.
QUESTION: Mr. Attorney General, with regard to your
statement a moment ago about other agencies of the Government
taking their own position here [supporting the Department of
Commerce and the Tennessee Valley Authority] contrary to what
the Solicitor General might be, I indicated that Congress has
expressly authorized it in some instances.
ATIORNEY GENERAL BELL: Right.
QUESTION: And I just suggested that this afternoon or
tomorrow we're hearing a case in which the Federal
Communications Commission is taking a position flatly contrary to
the Department of Justice on a case. It's not a rarity.
"Unusual" but "not a rarity"-that is the best way to describe intragovernmental conflict before the federal courts.

A. Attorney General Control of Government Litigation
The Attorney General's authority to manage government litigation is
the norm, not the exception. Congress has specified that, "[e]xcept as
otherwise authorized by law, the conduct of litigation in which the United
States, an agency, or officer thereof is a party, or is interested, and securing
evidence therefor, is reserved to officers of the Department of Justice, under
the direction of the Attorney General."20 In principle, this hierarchical
structure places the Attorney General, who answers only to the President,
above all government litigants both within and outside the Department of
Justice. The White House and Department of Justice endorse this conception of the Attorney General's role because it enables the government to
speak as a unified voice in court, and it places the President or his Cabinetlevel surrogate, the Attorney General, in charge of that voice. The realities
of Attorney General control, however, diverge from this hierarchical
scheme. Congress' power to make exceptions to Department of Justice
19. Oral Argument Transcript at 3, 32-33, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)
(No. 76-1701).
20. 28 u.s.c. § 516 (1988).
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control has severely eaten into the Attorney General's role as chief litigator
for the United States. Through these exceptions, Congress protects its prerogatives from Department of Justice centralization by transferring litigating authority to an agency or department that is more likely to endorse
congressional preferences.
Legislative grants of independent litigating authority ensure that a significant number of intragovernmental disputes are publicly aired before the
federal courts. Congressional exceptions to Department of Justice control,
moreover,-lack a coherent pattern. 21 Some entities, including the Federal
Election Commission,22 the Senate's Office of Legal Counsel,23 and special
prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in Government Act, 24 have
independent litigating authority on all matters before all courts; other entities (e.g., the Department of Agriculture, 25 the Federal Trade
Commission26) can litigate independently before all courts but only on
some matters. A second group of entities has litigating authority that
extends only to some courts, either on all matters (e.g., the Securities and
Exchange Commission,27 the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission,28 the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,29 the Internal
Revenue Service,30) or some matters only (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency,31 the Department of Health and Human Services32). Other
entities have independent litigating authority on some matters before all
courts and on other matters before some courts (e.g., the Federal Communications Commission,33 the Federal Maritime Commission34). Finally,
ambiguities in statutory language make unclear both the scope and sweep of
independent litigating authority for entities such as the U.S. Postal Service,35 the National Labor Relations Board,36 and the Tennessee Valley
Authority. 37 Intragovernmental conflict, therefore, manifests itself in
countless different forms depending on the issue and the court.
21. See Olson, supra note 10, at 73 n.12 (listing 35 federal entities that possessed some modicum
of independent litigating authority in 1982).
22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c{f)(4), 437d(a)(6), {b) (1988); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(a), 9040(a) (1988).
23. 2 U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288c, 288d, 288f (1988).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1988).
25. 7 U.S.C. § 228a (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1988).
26. 15 u.s.c. §56 (1988).
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (c), 78t(c), (d), (e), 78u(c), (d), {e) (1988).
28. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4{b), -5(f)(1), -5(f)(2), -S(i), -6 (1988).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 717s (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 518 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. 717l(i) (1988).
30. 26 u.s.c. § 7452 (1988)
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(e)(2)(a), (f)(3)(a)(ii), 2606(a), (c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1366 (1988); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9{f), 7605(a) (1988).
32. 42 u.s.c. § 405(1) (1988).
33. 47 u.s.c. § 154(f)(l) (1988).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2350 (1988); 46 U.S.C. app. § 1705(k) (1988).
35. 39 u.s.c. §§ 409(d), 3628 (I988).
36. 29 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 155, 1600), (I), 161(2) (1988).
37. For a discussion of TVA litigating authority, see infra note 104.
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From Decentralization Towards Centralization

The patchwork nature of governmental representation dates back to the
nation's beginnings.38 Before the Department of Justice was established in
1870, the Attorney General's role was to advise the President and Cabinet
officers and to represent the United States in the Supreme Court.39
Government litigation was principally the province of solicitors who
directly or through retained outside counsel represented executive departments and agencies in court.40 This decentralized scheme, while giving
way somewhat to the Department of Justice after its organization in 1870,
persisted because departmental solicitors continued to wield enormous
power through custom and/or statutory authorization.41
In 1933, a centralized Department of Justice began to wrestle control
from departmental solicitors. That year, President Roosevelt issued
an executive order placing control of governmental litigation in the
Department of Justice.42 The executive order was a mixed success.
Congressional action empowering governmental departments and agencies,
as well as agency efforts to side-step the executive order, limited its effectiveness.43 In 1955, the Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government (the Hoover Commission) again called for the
recognition of the Department of Justice "as the chief law office of the
Government."44 Congress instead authorized decentralization by providing
independent agencies as well as executive departments and agencies with
independent litigating authority.45
38. For histories of Department of Justice litigating authority, see Olson, supra note 10, at 75-78;
see also DoNALD L. HoROWITZ, THE JUROCRACY: GoVERNMENr LAWYERS, AGENCY PROGRAMS, AND
Juorc!AL DECrsroNs 12-20 (1977); LtrrnER A. HuSTON, THE DEPARTMENr oF JuSTICE (1967); DANIEL J.
MEADOR, THE PREsiDENT, 11iE ATIORNEY GENERAL, AND 11iE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 4-24 (1980);
John F. Davis, Department of Justice Control of Agency Litigation 1-17 (Aug. 14, 1975) (unpublished
report prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States) (focusing on civil litigation).
39. See MEADoR, supra note 38, at 6; Olson, supra note 10, at 75.
40. See MEADoR, supra note 38, at 7-9.
41. In fact, at frrst, Department of Justice attorneys both came from and continued to be housed in
the offices of the executive department and agency Solicitors. See Davis, supra note 38, at 4. By 1913,
moreover, the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, Labor, State, and Treasury all
maintained separate Solicitor's offices. See id.
42. Section 5 of the executive order transferred to the Department of Justice "[t]he function[] of
prosecuting in the courts of the United States claims and demands by, or offenses against the
Government of the United States." Exec. Order No. 6166, § 5 (1933), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 901
(1988).
43. See, e.g., Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, § 201, 56 Stat. 23, 29 (granting
independent litigating authority to attorneys appointed under § 201) (repealed 1966). See generally
PETER H. IRoNs, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS (1982) (discussing the Justice Department's litigation
control battles with three agencies created after Roosevelt's order: the National Recovery
Administration, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and the National Labor Relations Board).
44. Davis, supra note 38, at 5 (citing U.S. CoMM'N oN ORo. oF nm EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF nm
Gov'T, REPoRT ON LEGAL SERVICES AND PROCEDURES 6 (1955)).
45. See Olson, supra note 10, at 76; Davis, supra note 38, at 5.
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Congress' continued use of decentralizing techniques is to be
expected. Decentralization of litigating authority enlarges department and
agency responsibility, thereby providing oversight committees greater
opportunities to influence agency business.46 The Department of Justice
has nonetheless strengthened its hand in recent years. The Carter
Administration, through a 1979 executive order, established a Federal Legal
Council to, among other responsibilities, facilitate "coordination and communication among Federal legal offices" in order to "avoid inconsistent or
unnecessary litigation by agencies."47 The Reagan Administration
attempted to build upon these efforts, with mixed success, by expanding the
Federal Legal Council's size48 and using Office of Legal Counsel opinions
to strengthen Attorney General control of government litigation.49
The Carter and Reagan Departments of Justice also advanced centralization objectives through self-serving interpretations of their statutory litigating authority and the litigating authority of other governmental entities.
The Carter Department of Justice, for example, rejected Department of
State efforts to represent the United States in proceedings before the
International Court of Justice.50 Referring to "the Attorney General's plenary power over governmental litigation," the Department of Justice
refused to accept arguments attempting to distinguish domestic from international courts. 51 The Reagan Department of Justice was even more
aggressive in its attempts to centralize litigating authority. It openly challenged Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) efforts to file
an amicus brief before a federal appellate court. 52 The case, Williams v.
New Orleans, 5 3 called into question the use of race-conscious hiring goals
in the settlement of a statutory employment discrimination lawsuit brought
against the city of New Orleans. Although the EEOC is statutorily authorized to represent its interests before lower federal courts, the Department of
Justice argued that the EEOC lacked authority to participate in Williams.
46. See HoRownz, supra note 38, at 106-07.
47. Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 410 (1980), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1988).
48. See Olson, supra note 10, at 77.
49. See The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 47, 61-62 (1982) [hereinafter The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator] (concluding
that, in the absence of contrary legislative directives, "the Attorney General . . • has broad plenary
authority over all litigation in which the United States, or its federal agencies or departments, nre
involved"); Removal of Members of the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, 6 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 180, 187-88 (1982) (asserting that Congress did not, nnd could not, create a legislative scheme
that allows the Council to sue other executive agencies nnd thereby skirt the President's supervisory
control of the Executive Branch).
50. Litigation Responsibility of the Attorney General in Cases in the International Court of
Justice, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 233 (1980).
51. Id. at 234.
52. This episode is recounted at infra text accompanying notes 243-50. For a more detailed
account, see Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency
Independent?, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 273, 285-98 (1993).
53. 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984).
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Specifically, since the EEOC is not authorized to be a party to suits against
states and localities, the Department reasoned that the EEOC could not participate as an amicus in such suits.54
An even more dramatic example of Department of Justice efforts to
strongarm independent agency self-representation occurred during the final
days of the Bush Administration. In a dispute before the United States
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit between the U.S. Postal Service and
the Postal Rate Commission, the Justice Department advised the Postal
Service that it could not represent itself in court.55 Referring to admittedly
ambiguous statutory language, the Department argued that disputes between
the Postal Service and the Rate Commission should not be decided in court
but should instead be brokered within the Executive Branch.56 In an effort
to avoid having a court interpret the statutory language, the Department and
later President Bush "direct[ed]" the Postmaster General and the Postal
Service's Board of Governors to withdraw from the case.57 The President
went so far as to send a letter to each Postal Service Governor stating that,
to ensure compliance with the directive, he would "if necessary exercise
[his] authority to remove Governors of the Postal Service."58 Although a
preliminary injunction blocked the threatened removal, and the D.C. Circuit
ended this dispute by validating the Postal Service's claim of independent
litigating authority,5 9 the Bush White House demonstrated its willingness to
take any necessary steps to further Department of Justice control of government litigation.
The Bush and Reagan Administrations also went further than the
Carter Administration in their pursuit of centralization objectives. The
Carter Administration both ceded Congress' grant of independent litigating
authority to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission60 and signed memoranda of understanding recognizing litigating authority in some departments and agencies within the Executive Branch. 61 In contrast, the Reagan
Administration refused legislative initiatives designed to expand the litigating authority of government agencies and departments. 62 Reagan pocket54. Devins, supra note 52, at 286-88.
55. See Motion of the United States Postal Service For Leave to Appear as a Party on its Own
Behalf at 3-4, Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(No. 91-1058).
56. Id. at 8.
57. Memorandum from President George Bush to Postmaster General Marvin Runyon (Dec. 11,
1992).
58. Letter from President George Bush to Bert Mackie, Governor, U.S. Postal Service (Jan. 4,
1993).
59. Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
60. See CoMMIITEE ON GoVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S. Doc. No.
91, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 61-62 (1977).
61. See Olson, supra note 10, at 77-78.
62. President Reagan, however, did approve the 1987 reauthorization of the Ethics in Government
Act, which authorized independent counsel prosecutions of executive officials. See LoUIS FtsHER &
NEAL DEVINs, PounCAL DYNAMICS OF CoNSTITUilONAL LAw 146-48, 156-59 (1992).
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vetoed the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, for example, because it
empowered a special counsel to obtain judicial review of Merit Systems
Protection Board decisions. 63 Congress dropped this provision and successfully reintroduced the Act in 1989.64 The Bush Justice Department followed suit, objecting to a proposed Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight with independent litigating authority that was to be established
within the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 65
The Reagan and Bush Administrations also challenged nonstatutory
arrangements that executive departments and agencies had worked out with
previous administrations. For example, the Reagan Administration vigorously challenged Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) independence.
Among other things, it took issue with a 1973 EPA General Counsel opinion66 supporting EPA enforcement authority against federal facilities.
Heads of the Department of Justice's Land and Natural Resources Division
and its Office of Legislative Affairs challenged such EPA enforcement both
on policy grounds (improperly limiting Executive Branch policy coordination) and constitutional grounds (improperly asking the courts to resolve a
nonjusticiable intragovernmental dispute). 67 This controversy emerged
again during the Bush Administration in a dispute between the EPA and the
Department of Energy. The Bush Department of Justice followed its predecessor's lead and argued that it was inappropriate for the EPA to launch
enforcement actions against the Executive Branch without the approval of
the Attorney General. 68
Aggressive pursuit of centralization by the Reagan and Bush
Administrations is understandable. These two administrations seriously
examined and pursued a hierarchical vision of government. Their belief
that the Attorney General was czar over all government litigation was
reflected in Department of Justice efforts to limit executive and independent
agency autonomy before Congress and the courts. That the Carter
63. Memorandum of Disapproval for the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1988, 24 WI!I!KLY
CoMP. PREs. Doc. 1377 (Oct 26, 1988). For the president: ''The litigation of intra-Executive branch
disputes conflicts with the constitutional grant of the Executive power to the President, which includes
the authority to supervise and resolve disputes between his subordinates." !d. at 1378.
64. See 135 CoNo. REc. S2779-81 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Levin).
65. See Memorandum from American Law Division, Congressional Research Service, to Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (May 4, 1992) (discussing the legal bases for the
Department of Justice's objections to establishing an Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight).
66. EPA May Take Action Against Federal Facilities, Op. Gen. Counsel (Sept. 14, 1973),
reprinted in Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess.
648-67 (1987) [hereinafter Compliance Hearing].
67. See Compliance Hearing, supra note 66, at 182, 206-13 (statement of F. Henry Habicht n,
Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division); id. at 678-84 Oetter from Robert A.
McConnell, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs).
68. Memorandum of Understanding on Civil Enforcement Between the Justice Department and
the Environmental Protection Agency, [1992] Env't Rep. (BNA) 879-80 (June 13, 1977) (representing
the adoption of the 1977 memorandum by the Busll Administration).
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Administration also pursued centralization reveals the widely shared preference, within the Executive Branch at least, for coordinated decisionmaking.

2.

Limits on Department of Justice Centralization

White House efforts to preserve centralized litigating authority within
the Department of Justice have ensured Attorney General control of virtually all government litigation. 69 However, the Attorney General's ability to
truly reign in governmental litigation is an idea whose time is yet to come;
statutory limits on Department of Justice litigating authority may not be
typical but are hardly uncommon. Congress, for example, has created
offices of legal counsel within the House and Senate to ensure adequate
representation of legislative interests in court. Specialized courts, such as
the Tax Court and Court of Military Appeals, are the domain of "specialized agencies," such as the Internal Revenue Service70 and the Judge
Advocate General.71 Executive departments and agencies as well as government corporations have been granted independent litigating authority to
put numerous statutory programs into place through lower federal court litigation. The Environmental Protection Agency and the Departments of
Agriculture, Defense, Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury
head up the list of such executive entities.72 Before lower federal courts,
most independent agencies are able to conduct the bulk of their own litigation using agency attorneys.73
The patchwork nature of governmental representation is often an outgrowth of political conflict. The experience of the Federal Trade
69. The Department of Justice broadly interprets 28 U.S.C. § 519 (1988), which provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the Attorney General shall supervise all [governmental]
litigation,'' and 5 U.S.C. § 3106 (1988), which similarly states that "[e}xcept as otherwise authorized by
law, the head of an Executive department or military department may not employ an attorney •.. but
shall refer the matter to the Department of Justice." See The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator,
supra note 49. According to that Office of Legal Counsel opinion, it is irrelevant that the Attorney
General may allow agencies such as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation to represent themselves separately without explicit statutory authority. "Presumably, the
Attorney General may reassert his supervisory authority at any time." ld. at 48 n.l. This is precisely
what occurred in FTC v. Guigon, 390 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1968), where the Department of Justice,
through an amicus brief, successfully challenged the FTC's authority to enforce its subpoenas in federal
district court without the Attorney General's consent. For further discussion of the relationship between
the Department of Justice and the FTC, see infra text accompanying notes 74-86.
70. 26
§ 7441 (1988).
71. 10
§ 870 (1988).
72. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(e)(2)(a), (f)(3)(a)(ii), 2606(a), (c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1366 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9(f), 7605(a) (1988) (Environmental Protection Agency); 7 U.S.C.
§ 228a (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 2350(a) (1988) (Department of Agriculture); 10 U.S.C. § 1037 (1988)
(Department of Defense); 42 U.S.C. § 405(1) (1988) (Department of Health and Human Services); 29
U.S.C. §§ 216(e), 663 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), 30 U.S.C. § 822 (1988), 33 U.S.C. §§ 92la, 941 (1988)
(Department of Labor); 26 U.S.C. § 7452 (1988) (Department of Treasury).
73. See generally ADMINISTRATIVE CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MULTI-MEMBER
INDEPENDENr REGULATORY AGENCIES: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF THEIR ORGANIZATION (rev. ed. May
1992) [hereinafter MULTI-MEMBER INoEPENDENr REGULATORY AGENCIES}; Memorandum from
American Law Division, Congressional Research Service (July 7, 1988).

u.s.c.
u.s.c.
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Commission (FTC) provides an example. Prior to 1973, the Department of
Justice represented the FTC in injunctive and mandamus proceedings, civil
penalty suits, and through the Solicitor General, all Supreme Court litigation.74 Commission attorneys handled judicial review and enforcement proceedings.75 This division of responsibility proved problematic for the FTC.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice sometimes disagreed
with FTC antitrust policymaking. Consequently, on matters referred by the
FTC to the Department of Justice, significant delays in filing, unfavorable
settlements, and the refusal to file cases became common practice?6
On occasion, the Department of Justice also took issue with FTC positions in court. In the 1968 FTC v. Guigon decision, Justice argued that the
FTC lacked statutory authority to judicially enforce its own subpoenas and
possibly even lacked the power to appear in court.77 Justice's desire to
maximize its litigating authority at the expense of the FTC is certainly
understandable. Eyebrows were raised, however, when, after Justice's position prevailed before a federal appellate court, Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold (1967-1973) refused to file a certiorari petition on the ground that
"[w]hatever may be the merits of the Commission's position, [he did] not
believe the issue [was] of sufficient general importance to warrant requesting the Supreme Court to review it."78 By not seeking certiorari, the
Solicitor General shielded a Department of Justice victory from FTC attack.
A second case that caused great distress at the FTC was St. Regis
Paper Co. v. United States, a 1961 Supreme Court decision. 79 In that case,
the Antitrust Division agreed with the FTC's position that the agency's
interest in investigating possible antitrust violations outweighed confidentiality claims made by a company seeking to withhold reports filed with the
Census Bureau. The Solicitor General, however, sided with the Census
Bureau and the Bureau of the Budget in opposing the FTC. In a remarkable
and much criticized brief, Solicitor General Archibald Cox (1961-1965),
rather than "burdening the Court with briefs from different agencies,"
instead "attempt[ed] ... to set forth the competing arguments as effectively
74. Davis, supra note 38, at 11-12.
75. Id. at 11.
76. See Securities Exchange Act Amendments of 1973: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
343, 348-49, 355-57 (1978) [hereinafter Exchange Act Hearings] (testimony and statement of A.
Everette Macintyre, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission); A. Everette Macintyre, The Status of
Regulatory Independence, 29 FED. BJ. 1, 8-9 (1968) (noting instances during the 1960s when the
Solicitor General refused FrC requests to file petitions for certiorari or refused to support an agency's
position after allowing it to file in its own name).
77. 390 F.2d 323, 329-30 (8th Cir. 1968). For an FrC commissioner's view of this litigation, see
Macintyre, supra note 76, at 15-18 (arguing that the "legislative history of .•• the Federal Trade
Commission Act, long-established practice, ..• and applicable legal precedent did not intend the result
achieved by the court" (footnote omitted)).
78. Davis, supra note 38, at 35 (quoting a letter from Solicitor General Erwin Griswold to Paul R.
Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission (Apr. 26, 1968)).
79. 368 u.s. 208 (1961).
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and objectively as possible." 80 Since Cox disagreed with the FTC, the bulk
of his brief, "while fully recognizing the delicate balance of opposing considerations,"81 explained why the FTC position was in error.
Congress finally settled conflicts between the FTC and Justice to the
benefit of the FTC. In 1973, Congress enacted legislation ensuring FTC
independent litigating authority in enforcement actions before lower federal
courts. 82 Congress expanded that authority in 1975 to include the power of
the FTC to represent itself before the Supreme Court when the Solicitor
General would not represent the agency. 83 Tensions between the FTC and
Justice, exacerbated by both the Antitrust Division's apparently successful
attack on FTC litigating authority in Guigon and the Solicitor General's
questionable advocacy in Guigon, St. Regis, and other cases, may help
explain this political response. 84 That tension, however, explains only a
small part of the story. In 1974, the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce had concluded that Justice's concern that "the government maintain[ ] consistent positions on matters of common interest to all
government agencies" 85 outweighed the FTC's claim that "its litigation is
conducted in the manner best calculated to achieve the agency's enforcement goals." 86 The decision to transfer litigating authority to the FTC,
therefore, cannot simply be tied to Congress' displeasure with Justice's representation of FTC interests.
Instead, the ascendancy of independent FTC litigating authority is a
by-product of political circumstances unique to a particular moment in
time. 87 First, White House opposition to independent litigating authority in
general or to the FTC, specifically, was neutered in both 1973 and 1975. In
1973, President Nixon was willing to trade off the statutory specifications
of FTC litigating authority because he strongly supported other bill provi80. Brief for the United States at 10, St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States, 368 U.S. 208 (1961)
(No. 47).
81. /d. at 27.
82. Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 408, 87 Stat. 576,591-92
(1973).
83. Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 93-637, § 204, 88 Stat. 2183,2199
(1975).
84. The 1973 Act was predicated on congressional findings that "the investigative and law
enforcement responsibilities of the Federal Trade Commission have been restricted and hampered
because of inadequate legal authority." Trans-Alaska Oil Pipeline Authorization Act § 408(a)(l), 87
Stat. at 591.
85. Letter from Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs to Congressman Harley 0.
Staggers, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7702,7732.
86. Letter from FfC to Congressman Harley 0 . Staggers, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1107, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7702, 7732. Indeed, the 1975 legislation
reduced the scope of FrC litigating authority while expanding remaining litigating authority to include
Supreme Court representation. FfC Improvement Act § 204(a)(3){A), 88 Stat. at 2199-200.
87. These conclusions are principally drawn from interviews with current and former FfC
officials. See Interview with Calvin Collier, supra note 4; interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4.
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sions establishing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. 88 In 1975, the spectre of
Watergate limited President Ford's ability to demand centralization of government litigation before the Supreme Court. Second, Congress' willingness to decentralize government litigating authority was part of a larger
Watergate-era attempt to limit the "imperial presidency." At roughly the
same time, Congress limited White House authority in fiscal policy through
the 1974 Budget Act, considered making the Department of Justice an
independent agency, and debated legislation to further insulate independent
agencies from executive influence. 89 Third, Congress was set to act on
FTC-related litigation in both 1973 and 1975 regardless of the question of
independent litigating authority. 90 The costs to the FTC of raising the issue
and to Congress of adding it to much larger statutory reform efforts were,
therefore, low. Fourth, after Justice successfully attacked FTC litigating
authority in Guigon, the FTC's independence was plainly at risk. These
high stakes spurred the 1973 legislative action. Finally, public support of a
powerful, independent FTC was strong in the mid-seventies' "age of
consumerism."
This confluence of circumstances was clearly unique to the FTC, as
demonstrated by the contrasting experience of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). In 1973, Congress removed from proposed amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act language that would have granted
the SEC independ~nt litigating authority before the Supreme Court. This
refusal to grant the SEC the same type of litigating authority that the FTC
received two years later was also a by-product of political circumstances.
Unlike the FTC, whose very independence was threatened by Department
of Justice dominion over all litigation, the SEC already possessed independent litigating authority in all courts except the Supreme Court. 91 Before the
Supreme Court, moreover, the SEC was generally satisfied with the
Solicitor General's handling of its cases. Although the SEC technically
supported the proposed amendments, it did a poor job of making its case
before Congress. In fact, when Congress held hearings on the proposed
amendments, former SEC Chairman William Cary testified that he favored
Solicitor General control of the certiorari decision. 92 Philip Loomis, Jr.,
88. See Letter from Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs to Congressman Harley 0.
Staggers, supra note 85, at 7732-33 (stating that President Nixon reluctantly accepted limitations on
Department of Justice litigating authority "because of the Nation's pressing need for legislation
authorizing construction of the pipeline").
89. On the 1974 Act, see LoUIS FisHER, THE PoLmcs oF SHARED PoWER: CoNGRESs AND run
EXECUTIVE 177-204 (3d ed. 1993). On efforts to remove the Department of Justice from the Executive
Branch, see Politics Hearings, supra note 13. On proposed legislation to authorize independent agency
litigation before the Supreme Court, see STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 62-67.
90. The focus of 1973 legislation was the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. See supra note 84. Legislation
in 1975 involved a broad range of issues governing the structure and operations of the FI'C.
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (c), 78t(c), (d), (e), 78u(c), (d), (e) (1988).
92. See Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 232 (statement of former SEC Chairman
William Cary).
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serving as SEC Commissioner at the time, expressed uncertainty about the
amendments' value because the Solicitor General "has generally been sympathetic" to the SEC and because the Solicitor "has clearly been of value in
obtaining consideration of [SEC] cases by the Supreme Court and· in
presenting cases to that Court."93
The SEC presented a less convincing case for other reasons as well.
Not only was the SEC's claim a weak one, but also Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold launched a strong claim against the amendments. Griswold, who
served both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations, invoked his personal
prestige and that of his office in arguing that the proposed amendments
challenged the integrity of the Solicitor General's office. 94 In 1975,
Solicitor General Robert Bork (1973-1977), limited by his role in the dismissal of former Solicitor General Archibald Cox in the "Saturday Night
Massacre," could not launch a comparable counterattack against FrC
efforts.
Differences between the FrC and SEC experiences reveal that specific
political pressures and circumstances, not a unified vision of independent
litigating authority, define the existence, scope, and sweep of legislative
exceptions to Department of Justice control of government litigation. These
exceptions checker the landscape before lower federal courts. In addition to
Congress and independent agencies (where limitations on Justice's authority are to be expected), many executive departments, executive agencies,
and government corporations possess some independence in pursuing their
interests through litigation. 95 While presidential control of the hiring and
firing of executive officers provides some degree of centralizing control,
legislative decentralization of litigating authority nonetheless impedes the
coordination of Executive Branch arguments in court.
Before the Supreme Court, however, centralization predominates.
Statutory exceptions to Department of Justice control rarely include
Supreme Court litigation. Congress, for the most part, prefers the Solicitor
General to be the government's lawyer before the Court.96 At the same
time, while the Solicitor General's control is much more than a shibboleth,
his dominion over government litigation before the Supreme Court is
illusory.
93.

/d. at 299 (statement of SEC Commissioner Philip Loomis, Jr.). This is still the SEC's view.

See Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4; Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4.
94. See Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 278-80 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold). Griswold concluded his opening presentation at the hearings with the statement, "I would be
very sorry and would regard it as unfortunate if the function and prestige of the Office of the Solicitor
General was impaired [by the amendment's passage]." /d. at 277.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 22-37. For a fairly complete list of governmental entities
that possess independent litigating authority, see Memorandum from American Law Division,
Congressional Research Service, supra note 73.
96. For Congress' reasons for preferring Solicitor General control, see infra text accompanying
note 363.
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Solicitor General Control of Supreme Court Litigation

The Solicitor General is the Department of Justice's official voice
before the Supreme Court97 and is the only litigant who has a right to participate in Supreme Court litigation without seeking the Court's permission.98 This authority is indeed awesome. Nonetheless, the prospect of
government entities outside the Department of Justice separately representing their interests before the Supreme Court is quite real. Statutory grants
of litigating authority outside Department of Justice control, political necessity, and comity between the Solicitor General's office and other government entities ensure that the government does not speak as a single voice
before the Supreme Court.
Congress uses grants of independent litigating authority to legislative
entities such as the Comptroller General and the Senate's Office of Legal
Counsel to ensure the vigorous defense of its priorities. 99 Since these types
of grants allow Congress to protect its interests as a coequal branch of government from a Solicitor General answerable to the Attorney General and
the White House, they are the least surprising statutory exceptions to
Department of Justice control. For similar reasons, the Supreme Court has
approved court-appointed counsel to prosecute contempt of court actions in
cases where the Department of Justice is unwilling to defend the independent interests of the judicial branch. 100
Potential conflicts of interest with the Executive Branch explain statutory grants of independent litigating authority to the Federal Election
Commission (FEC) and to special prosecutors appointed under the Ethics in
Government Act. 101 Another type of statutory exception is harder to
explain. It applies to some but not all independent agencies as well as to
97. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(a) (1992) (providing that the Solicitor General has authority for
"[c]onducting, or assigning and supervising, all Supreme Court cases [within Department of Justice
control], including appeals, petitions for and in opposition to certiorari, briefs and arguments."
(emphasis added)).
98. 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
99. 2 U.S.C. § 687 (1988), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-4(b), 6384(a), (c) (1988) (Comptroller General); 2
U.S.C. §§ 288b, 288c, 288d, 288f (1988) (Office of Senate Legal Counsel). Although the President
possesses limited appointment and removal power over the Comptroller General, the Comptroller is
typically thought to be an arm of Congress. See Bowsher v. Synnr, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (striking down
the Gramm-Rudman Act on separation of powers grounds becatise the Act gives an executive function
to the Comptroller General, who is subject to control by Congress); Bernard Schwartz, An
Administrative Law "Might Have Been"-Chief Justice B11rger's Bowsher v. Synnr Draft, 42 ADMIN. L.
REv. 221, 232 (1990) ("[T]he key to Bowsher 'is that the Comptroller General is removable by
Congress, and therefore may not be entrusted with executive powers."' (quoting a letter from Chief
Justice Warren Burger to Justice John Paul Stevens (June 10, 1986))).
100. Young v. United States ex rei. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987). The Solicitor
General supports this position, recognizing that judicial authority here is "an ancillary aspect of its
powers under Article III." Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 8 n.2, United States v.
Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988) (No. 87-65).
101. The independent litigating authority of these officials is established in 2 U.S.C. §§ 437c(0(4),
437d(a)(6), (b) (1988) (Federal Election Commission) and 28 U.S.C. § 594(a) (1988) (special
prosecutors) (referred to as "independent counsel").
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the Department of Agriculture, 102 and it is clearly a by-product of political
circumstances. Two independent agencies, the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC) and the FI'C, may represent themselves before the
Supreme Court whenever the Solicitor General refuses to defend their position. 103 This authority may also extend to the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) and the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). 104 Finally,
through the Hobbs Act, specified agencies may seek certiorari regardless of
Solicitor General approval, but only to defend an administrative order. 105
Hobbs Act cases are rare, for the agency can break free from the Solicitor
General only when there is an irreconcilable divergence of views. In those
cases, the agency and the Solicitor General each appear before the Court as
named parties.
The Hobbs Act and similar statutory exceptions to Department of
Justice control limit the Solicitor General in other ways. For example,
while these statutory exceptions do not prevent the Solicitor General from
expressing views contrary to the agency's, it is sometimes in the Solicitor
General's broader political interests to support the agency before the
Supreme Court in a case in which he would otherwise decline participation.

102. The Department of Agriculture, as a matter of course, refers all Supreme Court cases to the
Solicitor General. The special problem of intraexecutive disputes outside of the Solicitor General's
control has yet to arise.
103. ICC power dates back to 1910, Pub. L. No. 475, ch. 231, § 212, 36 Stat 1087, 1150-51
(1911), and has been reaffirmed several times. See generally Davis, supra note 38, at 6-11. For a
discussion of FI'C litigating authority, see supra text accompanying notes 82-86.
104. There is a lack of consensus about the litigating authority of the NLRB and the TVA before
the Supreme Court The NLRB enjoys independent litigating authority under its statute, but the statute
does not speak to the issue of Supreme Court representation. 29 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 155, 160(j), (1),
161(2) (1988). The Solicitor General perceives that this silence implicitly authorizes his control. See,
e.g., FRIED, supra note 7, at 175-82 (discussing Fried's handling of Communications Workers of Am. v.
Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988)); William E. Brigman, The Office of the Solicitor General of the United
States 124 (1966) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill))
(discussing Archibald Cox's management of NLRB cases). Like the NLRB, the TVA lacks specific
authority to represent itself before the Court The historic practice here, however, is for the TVA to
assert complete independence. See The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, supra note 49, at 47
n.l. In fact, when the TVA and Solicitor General jointly present a case to the Court, the TVA General
Counsel insists that his name appear above the names of Solicitor General attorneys (except for the
Solicitor General himself). See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, cover, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437
U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 76-1701) (indicating the name of the General Counsel for the TVA above the
names of the other Solicitor General attorneys but under the name of the Solicitor General).
105. The Hobbs Act applies to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC), the Secretary of Agriculture, and the U.S. Postal Service. Pub. L. No.
901, ch. 1189, § 8, 64 Stat 1129, 1131 (1950) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1988) (FCC, FMC,
Secretary of Agriculture); Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (Postal Service). Under the Hobbs Act, the Attorney General is a statutory defendant in
charge of the government's interests. The FCC, FMC, and Department of Agriculture, however, are
authorized to intervene as of right and, regardless of the Solicitor General's action, to file for certiorari.
The Act is silent on the issue of whether the affected agencies may ftle briefs and argue cases before the
Court.

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 275 1994

276

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:255

According to FfC officials, 106 this is what occurred in FI'C v. Ticor Title
Insurance Co., 107 a 1992 case in which the FfC almost certainly would
have sought Supreme Court review with or without Solicitor General participation. As will be detailed below, 108 the Solicitor General, perhaps fearing
the loss of controlling the government's arguments in the Ticor case, took
charge of the case from the certiorari petition stage.
Political calculations occur regardless of the presence of statutory
exceptions, and they occur in different forms. Witness the Solicitor
General's bizarre handling of the Bob Jones University 109 litigation in an
attempt to stave off political embarrassment. 110 Bob Jones concerned the
IRS' longstanding practice of denying tax breaks to racially discriminatory
private schools. After defending the government's policy in the early
months of the Reagan Administration, the Treasury Department, persuaded
by Attorney General William French Smith, reversed the IRS position. 111
This reversal proved to be a public policy debacle. The President felt compelled to tell the nation that he was not a racist, and the Department of
Justice concluded that it was better to litigate than to moot the Bob Jones
case. The rub, however, was that the Reagan Administration did not
rescind its policy reversal. To escape this predicament, the Solicitor
General asked the Court to appoint "counsel adversary" to Bob Jones
University to defend the Treasury Department's earlier position. 112 The
Court complied with this unorthodox request and heard arguments from
William Ball on behalf of Bob Jones University, court-appointed "counsel
adversary" William Coleman on behalf of the Treasury Department, and
Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds on behalf of the
United States.U 3 That Coleman defended and Reynolds opposed the IRS'
nondiscrimination policy did not bother the Court or the Department of
Justice.
106. Department of Justice officials did not corroborate FTC officials' account of Ticor and were
skeptical of their description.
107. 112 S. Ct 2169 (1992).
108. See infra text accompanying notes 310-11.
109. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
110. For a general background discussion and analysis of the Bob Jones litigation, see CAPLAN,
supra note 7, at 51-64; Neal Devins, Bob Jones University v. United States: A Political Analysis, I J.L.
& PoL. 403 (1984); Jeremy A. Rabkin, Taxing Discrimination: Federal Regulation of Private Education
by the Internal Revenue Service, in PuBLIC VALUES, PRIVATE ScHooLS 133, 146-51 (Neal E. Devins ed.,
1989).
111. Stuart Taylor Jr., U.S. Drops Rule on Tax Penalty for Racial Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1982,
at 1. Accordingly, the Department of Justice filed a motion before the Supreme Court to moot Bob
Jones and related litigation. Memorandum for the United States, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v.
United States and Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3).
112. See Thomas McCoy and Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax
Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FoRDHAM L. REv. 441, 464 (1984).
113. See Oral Argument Transcript, Goldsboro Christian Sch., Inc. v. United States and Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (Nos. 81-1, 81-3).
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Dual governmental presentations such as in Bob Jones are, to put it
mildly, an anomaly. Yet, occasionally the Solicitor General either explains
to the Court an intragovernmental conflict or authorizes an executive or
independent agency to present before the Court a position at odds with the
Solicitor General's. 114 Numerous factors explain the Solicitor General's
willingness to limit his control in such a fashion. First, when the Solicitor
General presents both sides of an issue to the Court but then chooses one,
he in effect advocates that position. Second, sometimes amicus positions
filed by other governmental entities serve the Solicitor General's interests
better than his own filings. For example, in Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, it would have been impolitic for the Solicitor
General to refuse to defend Massachusetts' veterans' preference due to the
prevalence of analogous federal preferences. 115 To address the gross disparities of the Massachusetts' preference on women, Solicitor General
Wade McCree (1977-1981) authorized a coalition of executive and
independent entities to file a joint amicus brief addressing "important considerations concerning the differences between the federal and the state statute and the relevant proof requirements." 116
Third, Solicitor General authorization of dual representation sometimes improves its status as an impartial litigant before both the Court and
Congress. In contrast, the Solicitor General shatters his imagined status as
an objective nonpartisan advocate before the Supreme Court when he mutes
the concerns of an agency with which he disagrees. This is especially true
in cases where the independent agency is a party to the litigation and arguably the Solicitor General's client. Consequently, the Solicitor General
authorized dual representation in Dirks v. SEC, 117 Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC, 118 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 119 and United Rubber, Cork,
Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB. 120 This concern is less acute in
cases where the United States appears as a party or in an amicus capacity.
Nonetheless, in a variety of such cases involving the SEC, the EEOC, the
114. See infra Part II.A.
115. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 2, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256 (1979) (No. 78-233) (acknowledging that "[t]he Court's constitutional analysis of the
Massachusetts program may affect the federal program ... in spite of the differences between the two").
116. See Brief of the Office of Personnel Management, the United States Department of Defense,
the United States Department of Labor, and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici
Curiae at 3, Feeney (No. 78-233). Coincidentally, female Carter appointees were named counsel for
each of these federal entities.
117. 463 U.S. 646 (1983). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes
193-97.
118. 497 U.S. 547 (1990). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying notes
224-32.
119. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). For further discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying note
219.
120. 362 U.S. 329 (1960) (per curiam). In this case, a joint memorandum was prepared explaining
why the NLRB supported the granting of certiorari and why the Solicitor General opposed certiorari.
The Court sided with the NLRB and granted certiorari.
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FERC, and the Federal Power Commission, the Solicitor General either
authorized separate filings or took note of a disagreement between his
office and an independent agency. 121
As shown above, the dual representations brought about by statutory
exceptions and political accommodations extend well beyond Congress and
its agents to independent agencies and parts of the Executive Branch.
While the Solicitor General is the dominant voice of government before the
Supreme Court, dual presentations in numerous Supreme Court cases suggest that Solicitor General control of that voice need not be, and in fact is
far from, complete. It is simply wrong, therefore, to think of government
litigation before the Supreme Court as being controlled by a monolithic
Solicitor General.

C.

Summary: Independent Agencies and the Patchwork Nature of
Independent Litigating Authority

The reach of Department of Justice control in general and Solicitor
General control in particular is ill-suited to generalization. Concomitantly,
the nature and sweep of independent agency control over Supreme Court
litigation are extraordinarily varied. For some agencies, independent litigating authority simply does not exist. This is the case with the National
Transportation Safety Board; 122 it used to be so with the FTC and the now
defunct Civil Aeronautics Board. 123 In other instances, agency authority
extends to Supreme Court litigation, although it sometimes depends on the
Solicitor General's refusal to participate. The FEC, FTC, ICC, and perhaps
the NLRB, Postal Service, and TVA have such power. 124
In most cases, however, agency litigating authority is a mixture of
dependence and independence. Even the level of dependence varies. For
the SEC, EEOC, and FERC, independent litigating authority extends to the
121. See infra notes 185-209 and accompanying text (SEC); infra notes 233-68 and accompanying
text (EEOC). For example, the Federal Power Commission was allowed to file an amicus brief
opposing the Solicitor General's brief in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). In
Utah Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 463 U.S. 1230 (1983), Solieltor General Rex Lee, instead of forcing
the FERC to accede to his point of view, resolved the dispute by asking the Court to remand the case for
further consideration of the FERC's position. See REBECCA M. SALOKAR, ThB SoLICITOR GBNERAL: THB
PoLITics oF LAw 85 (1992). Another dispute involving the FERC was Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. Ln
Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765 (1984), in which the FERC and the Department of Interior
battled over an FERC license for a water project that affected numerous Indian reservations. The
Solicitor General sided with the Secretary of Interior. For further discussion, see Herz, supra note 16, ot
980 n.331.
122. See 49 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988).
123. See supra text aecompanying notes 74-89 for a discussion of the development of FfC
litigating authority. The Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), like the FfC, claimed thot the Department of
Justice inadequately represented its interests in court. See Note, Government Litigation in the Supreme
Court: The Roles of the Solicitor General, 78 YALB LJ. 1442, 1451 n.48 (1969). Unlike with the FfC,
Congress demurred on repeated CAB efforts to gain control over its litigation. See id.
124. See supra notes 101-05 and accomponying text.
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federal courts of appeals. 125 The Consumer Product Safety Commission's
independent litigating authority extends only to district court actions. 126
The independent litigating authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and the Commodities Future Trading Commission is limited to appellate
litigation. 127 Finally, there are several agencies whose arrangements are so
complex that they defy description. The FCC is one of these. 128 In actions
launched in district court, including suits to enforce Commission orders, the
Department of Justice has plenary responsibility over the matter. The
Commission handles appeals of radio and television licensing decisions
before courts of appeals, but the Solicitor General handles them before the
Supreme Court. Appeals of other FCC decisions are handled by the
Commission before courts of appeals and in some instances up to the_ filing
of a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court. 129
That patchwork nature of independent agency litigating authority is
rooted in historical and organizational bases. Independent agencies were
formed at different times and by different interest groups. Organizationally,
the authorizing committees within Congress that oversee independent agencies are driven by substantive issues, not structural arrangements. The
Energy and Commerce Committee cares about FCC decisionmaking, not
whether the FCC has more or less independent litigating authority than
another agency. When structural issues bear on substance, as was the case
when the Department of Justice ran roughshod over the FTC, oversight
committees may well lead the charge for limiting executive control in favor
of independent litigating authority. When structural issues do not bear on
substance, as was the case with the SEC, Congress will not alter structure.
Far-ranging structural reform proposals do occasionally crop up.
Senator Abraham Ribicoff led a post-Watergate effort to assess regulatory
organization, 130 but nothing came of this effort to alter the patchwork struc125. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77t(b), (c), 78t(c), (d), (e), 78u(c), (d), (e) (1988) (SEC); 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-4(b), -5(£)(1), -5(£)(2), -5(i), -6 (1988) (EEOC); 15 U.S.C. § 717(s) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 518
(1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 717l(i) (1988) (FERC).
126. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2061(e), 2071(a), 2076(b)(7) (1988) (granting limited authority to the
Consumer Product Safety Commission to represent itself before federal district courts).
127. See 28 U.S.C. § 2348 (1988) (Nuclear Regulatory Commission); 7 U.S.C. § 4a(c) (1988)
(Commodities Future Trading Commission). The Commodities Future Trading Commission can also
represent itself in some district court actions. See 7 U.S.C. § 4a-1 (1988).
128. The Federal Mine Safety Commission is another. As described in an Administrative
Conference Report:
The Commission has an understanding with the Department of Justice that should the
Commission wish to file a brief or otherwise defend its decisions, the Commission would
coordinate its efforts with the Department of Justice. The Commission, however, does file
routine procedural motions, through the Office of General Counsel, in the Courts of Appeal.
Under the Mine Act, the Department of Labor has specific litigating authority in the areas of
injunctive relief and enforcement of Commission orders and decisions •••• The Commission
has supoena [sic] enforcement authority in the United States District Courts.
MULTI-MEMBER INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES, supra note 73, at 10-11.
129. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 519, 2350 (1988); 47 U.S.C. § 154(f)(i) (1988).
130. See STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60.
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ture of independent litigating authority. It is unlikely that future efforts will
prove more consequential. Each agency serves a quite different constituency, and it is highly unlikely that these divergent interests will jointly pursue some effort to create uniform structural arrangements. The present
haphazard structure is a far better reflection of divergent legislative
interests.
The likely perseverance of the current discordant system does not
make it preferable to others. The next Part will examine the appropriate
reach of Solicitor General authority in managing independent agency litigation before the Supreme Court.
II
SoLICITOR GENERAL CoNTRoL OVER INDEPENDENT AGENCY
LmoATION

Independent agency authority to litigate before the Supreme Court
without Solicitor General authorization is the exception, not the rule. This
model of centralized decisionmaking, with the Solicitor General at the helm
of government litigation before the Supreme Court, is almost uniformly
supported both by independent agency officials and attorneys in the
Solicitor General's office. 131 Exceptions to Solicitor General authority are
tolerated not because these exceptions are necessary but because there are
so few of them. This view is so pervasive that agencies with independent
litigating authority nonetheless profess that extending such authority elsewhere Inight comproinise the government's credibility before the Supreme
Court.t32
Supporters of centralization advance three principal contentions about
Solicitor General representation. 133 First, the Solicitor General is unlikely
to abandon his independent agency client in favor of the Executive
Branch's political agenda since he is sensitive to his client's concerns and
generally unaffected by White House priorities. Second, it is beneficial for
an independent agency to give up control of litigation in exchange for the
well-deserved prestige of Solicitor General representation in the petition for
certiorari and in Supreme Court advocacy. Third, Solicitor General centralization is of great value to the Supreme Court. Centralization saves the
Court from facing an incomprehensible morass of conflicting governmental
presentations, and it enables the Court to manage its docket by relying on
Solicitor General recommendations on a case's cert-worthiness.
131. Among those interviewed for this study, only former Assistant to the Solicitor General Carter
Phillips advocated independent agency self-representation before the Supreme Court. Interview with
Carter Phillips, supra note 5.
132. Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4.
133. These contentions are advanced by centralization supporters who recognize independent
agency authority to reach policy decisions at odds with the White House. Proponents of the unitary
executive, in contrast, perceive that centralization is a necessary attribute of White House control of
governmental departments and agencies. See infra text accompanying note 137.
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While each of these arguments is powerful, none warrants complete
Solicitor General control over independent agency litigation. There are too
many counterexamples of Solicitor General insensitivity and hostility to
independent agency priorities to allow the Solicitor General to define the
legal policymaking of an entity outside of Executive Branch control.
Instead, assuming that independent agencies may reach policy decisions at odds with the Executive Branch, Congress should adopt a hybrid
model where an independent agency, while otherwise bound to Solicitor
General representation, has a presumptive right to pursue a case before the
Court when the Solicitor General either perceives the case unworthy of certiorari or disagrees on the merits. This system, especially if Congress
makes the Solicitor General a statutory litigant in all government cases
before the Court, better serves the independent agency's interests without
undermining the Solicitor General's critical roles in assisting the Court,
advocating Executive Branch positions, or providing legal counsel to
independent agencies. The balance of this Part will evaluate these arguments for centralization and, along the way, make a case for the hybrid
model of Solicitor General-independent agency representation. 134
A.

The Solicitor General and His "Client"

The Solicitor General manages Supreme Court litigation that
originates in governmental agencies, boards, commissions, corporations,
departments, and services. This centralization naturally limits the ability of
the affected governmental interest to define its own litigation strategy. The
question remains, however, whether the Solicitor General views as his client the governmental entity he purportedly represents or the President, the
head of the Executive Branch. The "traditional" view holds that, barring a
direct conflict with stated White House policy, the Solicitor General's principal client is the governmental entity involved in the litigation. 135
Centralization of authority, under this view, serves a range of nonideological objectives, including having all governmental parties that might be
affected by a Supreme Court decision express their concerns to an objective
broker; "avoiding the litigation of significant legal issues that have government wide impact in a case which, because of its factual and procedural
134. This discussion assumes that independent agencies, for better or worse, are empowered to
reach policy decisions at odds with the White House.
135. Proponents of this view include former Attorney General Griffm Beii, former Solicitors
General Erwin Griswold and Robert Stern, and academic commentators Lincoln Caplan and Burt
Neuborne. See Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 272-92 (testimony and statement of Solicitor
General Erwin Griswold); Solicitor General's Office: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and
Commercial Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 36, 38-41 (1987)
[hereinafter Solicitor General Hearing] (statement of Professor Burt Neuborne); CAPLAN, supra note 7,
at 33-50; Griffm B. Beii, The Attorney General: The Federal Government's Chief Lawyer and Chief
Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1049, 1057-59 (1978); Stern, supra note 3.
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coloration, may be a poor vehicle for litigating the question"; 136 and transferring control on issues that apply to the government as a whole and are
only of secondary concern to the governmental entity. In contrast, the "unitary executive" view, while generally supportive of these bureaucratic justifications, emphasizes that "the Attorney General alone is obligated to
represent the broader interests of the Executive" and that centralization
therefore facilitates "presidential supervision . . . over Executive Branch
policies that are implicated in litigation." 137
Independent agencies care a great deal about which of these views
predominates. The unitary executive view places the Solicitor General
squarely under the Attorney General's control in the Executive Branch and
subordinates independent agency perspectives to those of the White House
and Attorney General. The traditional model, in contrast, places a high
value on Solicitor General representation of independent agency views
before the Court.
1.

Locating the Solicitor General

It is somewhat surprising that there is any dispute over whom the
Solicitor General represents. The Solicitor General is appointed by the
President, housed in the Department of Justice, and subject to supervision
from the Attorney General and to removal by the President. Yet, while no
one doubts that the Solicitor General can be compelled to advance a position he disfavors, it is nonetheless true, as the Carter Office of Legal
Counsel (OLC) observed in 1977, that "[t]raditionally, ... the Attorney
General has given the Solicitor General the primary responsibility for
presenting the Government's views to the Supreme Court, and in the discharge of that function the Solicitor General has enjoyed a marked degree
of independence." 138
This tradition of independence has led many to conclude that the
Solicitor General properly occupies a quasi-independent status within the
Department of Justice. For example, in the wake of White House and
Cabinet-level intervention in the crafting of the Solicitor General's brief in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 139 the Carter OLC proclaimed, in accordance with Attorney General Griffin Bell's wishes, that:
The dual nature of the Attorney General's role as a policy and
legal adviser to the President strengthens, in our view, the necessity
for an independent Solicitor General. To the extent the Solicitor
General can be shielded from political and policy pressures-without being unaware of their existence-his ability to serve the
136. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 279 (statement of Solicitor Geneml Erwin
Griswold).
137. The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, supra note 49, at 54.
138. Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 228, 229 (1977).
139. 438 u.s. 265 (1978).
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Attorney General, and the President, as "an officer learned in the
law" is accordingly enhanced. 140
Several Solicitors General have also proclaimed their independence, arguing that they have "no master to serve except [their] country," 141 refusing
to sign Supreme Court briefs that reflect White House policies with which
they disagree, 142 and emphasizing that they have special responsibilities
that limit their responsibility to the Executive Branch. 143 Even Charles
Fried (1985-1989), whose alleged fidelity to the Reagan Administration's
social agenda subjected him to blistering accusations of improperly
politicizing his office, spoke of the Solicitor General as the Court's "handmaiden[ ]" 144 and claimed that he ''had been appointed to exercise [his]
judgment, rather than to try to guess what Ronald Reagan would have said
about some particular technical matter." 145
Executive Branch officials do not typically display such acts of independence or express such proclamations. This independence, however, is
more ephemeral than real. The Solicitor General's traditional independence
stems largely from the benefit the White House receives by allowing the
Solicitor General to maximize his litigating capital and authority. Were the
Solicitor General to appear overly partisan in his selection and presentation
of cases, his credibility and his effectiveness as a litigant before the Court
would be impaired. 146 Executive Branch interests, therefore, are well
served by being represented before the Court by an advocate who has a
special relationship with the Court. The centralization of litigating authority in an individual who operates at the pleasure of the President also serves
140. Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138, at 232-33. Griffin Bell's support of Solicitor
General independence is reflected in his firsthand account of the politics of Bakke. See GRIFFIN B. BELL
& RoNALD J. Osmow, TAKING CARE oF nm LAw 29-32 (1982).
141. BIDDLE, supra note 11, at 98.
142. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 58-59 (discussing Acting Solicitor General Lawrence Wallace's
initial refusal to sign a government brief supporting tax breaks for racist schools in Bob Jones
University); FRIED, supra note 7, at 202 n.* (discussing Solicitor General Philip Perlman's refusal to
sign a government brief supporting the loyalty oath in Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955)); SALOKAR,
supra note 121, at 74 (recounting Solicitor General Erwin Griswold's refusal to advocate delays of
school desegregation in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969)).
143. See Erwin N. Griswold, Book Review, CoNSTmiTION, Spring-Summer 1991, at 73, 73
(reviewing FRIED, supra note 7, and taking issue with Fried's view and arguing that a Solicitor
General's responsibility is to the Constitution before the President); see also Eric Schnapper, Becket at
the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1187 (1988)
(identifying among the Solicitor General's primary responsibilities his duties as an officer of the Court);
Richard G. Wilkins, An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY. L.A. L.
REv. 1167, 1169 (1988) (arguing that the Solicitor General must temper his advocacy of an
administration's views so that he ''never sacrifice[s] his credibility and reliability as a trusted officer of
the Court'').
144. McGinnis, supra note 9, at 802 (quoting Charles Fried).
145. FRIED, supra note 7, at 191. For a penetrating attack of Fried's position, see McGinnis, supra
note 9, at 802 (describing the "handmaiden" view as "deeply flawed" and asserting that the Solicitor
General "must project vigorously, albeit respectfully, the President's distinctive constitutional voice").
146. See Michael W. McConnell, The Rule of Law and the Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LoY.
L.A. L. REv. 1105, 1107-08 (1988).
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Executive Branch interests. Consequently, it matters to the Executive
Branch that Congress support centralization of Supreme Court litigating
authority. Were the Solicitor General consistently to disregard independent
agency interpretations in favor of Executive Branch preferences, Congress
might well retaliate by limiting Solicitor General authority over government
litigation, as it did with the FfC.
Solicitor General independence also serves the Executive Branch in
other ways. The prestige of the White House and Attorney General is
improved by preserving Solicitor General independence. Specifically, by
freeing the Solicitor General from partisan politics, the White House places
the national interest in an objective advocate before the Supreme Court
ahead of narrow political interests. Richard Nixon appointed Erwin
Griswold for this reason, 147 and Griffin Bell defended the insulation of the
Solicitor General's office from the White House for similar reasons. 148
Solicitor General independence is also a by-product of an administrative state too large not to be decentralized. The White House typically
leaves political appointees to their own devices unless it cares deeply about
an issue. 149 Consequently, White House and Attorney General involvement
in Solicitor General litigation is usually a function of a case's political significance and its bearing on administration policy initiatives and/or constituency interests.
Supreme Court litigation is highly visible and, rather than involving
one or two subject areas, cuts across all of government. Consequently,
White House participation in Solicitor General advocacy arises with some
frequency. Modem accounts of such intervention include the following:
Harry Truman's involvement in an amicus curiae filing in Shelly v.
Kraemer; 150 Dwight Eisenhower's drafting of portions of the government's
brief in Brown v. Board of Education,· 151 the Kennedy Administration's
order to Archibald Cox to challenge private discrimination as unconstitutional state action; 152 the Nixon Administration's intervention in the
Solicitor General's filing in the Pentagon Papers 153 case and its involve147. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 33.
148. See BELL & OSTRow, supra note 140, at 31 (describing Bell's efforts to protect Solicitor
General Wade McCree from the pressure of White House views about McCree's brief in Bakke).
149. As Charles Fried put it: "Public office is an interpretive activity. The officer tries to mnke the
best sense out of his assignment He must judge how to mnke a coherent morally and politically good
whole out of his political superior's directives, pronouncements, hints, and actions." FRIED, supra note
7, at 191. On the question of whether Fried actually embraced this interpretive loyalty model, sec
McGinnis, supra note 9, at 814 (concluding that Fried "lacked .•. a coherent theory'' of the role of the
Solicitor General's office in fulfilling "the administration's jurisprudential views").
150. 334 U.S. I (1948); see Norman Silber, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter,
and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960: An Oral History, 100 HARV. L. REv. 817, 817-19 (1987)
(interviewing Philip Elman).
151. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 31; Silber, supra note 150, at 842.
152. See VIcroR S. NAVASKY, KENNEDY JuSTICE 287-90 (1971).
153. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 284 1994

1994]

INDEPENDENT AGENCY LITIGATION

285

ment in school desegregation and antitrust matters; 154 Gerald Ford's brokerage of a dispute between the FEC and the Solicitor General in Buckley v.
Valeo 155 and Ford Administration participation in school desegregation
cases and Department of Interior matters; 156 the Carter White House's
reversal of the Solicitor General's preliminary position in Bakke; 157 the
Reagan Administration's reversal of the Solicitor General's stated position
in Bob Jones University and its insistence that the Solicitor General file an
amicus brief calling for the overturning of Roe v. Wade in Thornburg v.
College of Obstetricians; 158 President Bush's order to the Solicitor General
to reverse its position in the Supreme Court and support increased state aid
to black public colleges to remedy discrimination; 159 and President
Clinton's indirect rebuke of the Solicitor General's brief in Knox v. United
States, a child pornography case. 160
The frequency of such White House involvement varies from administration to administration. Carter Attorney General Griffin Bell disapproved
of White House or Attorney General intervention in Department of Justice
litigation. Bell sought to insulate the Solicitor General's office and to make
sure that there was no "interfere[nce] with the policy prerogatives of our
agency clients."161 Carter Solicitor General Wade McCree used his office's
independence to protect agency prerogatives, allowing agency officials to
present conflicting positions to the Court whenever he and they disagreed. 162 In contrast, the Reagan Administration, especially the
Department of Justice, believed more in hierarchical centralized contro1. 163
Centralization better enabled the administration to advance its vision of
154. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 34 (discussing Nixon Administration intervention in the
Pentagon Papers case); SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 73-74 (discussing Nixon Administration
intervention in school desegregation).
155. 425 u.s. 946 (1976).
156. Ford Administration involvement in Buckley v. Valeo is recounted in Representation of
Congress and Congressional Interests in Court: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 120-35 (1976) [hereinafter
Representation Hearings]. Ford Administration intervention in Department of Interior matters is
described in SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 75.
157. See BELL & OSTRow, supra note 140, at 29-32; CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 39-48; FISHER &
DEVINs, supra note 62, at 286.
158. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 54-59, 139-44; FRIED, supra note 7, at 27-35.
159. See Linda Greenhouse, Bush Reverses U.S. Stance Against Black College Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 22, 1991, at B6; Carol Innerst, Bush Orders Switch on Black College Aid, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23,
1991, at A4.
160. See David Johnson, Clinton Calls for Expansion of Child Pornography Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1993, at A14. For a more detailed examination of Clinton White House intervention in
Solicitor General filings, see Joan Biskupic, For Solicitor General's Office, New Directions in Old
Cases, WASH. PoST, Feb. 22, 1994, at AI.
161. Bell, supra note 135, at 1061.
162. See Wade H. McCree, Jr., The Solicitor General and His Client, 59 WAsH. U. L.Q. 337, 346
(1981) (contending that the Solicitor General should either present, or allow the agency to present, the
agency's views where ''well-grounded differences of opinion" exist).
163. See generally GEORGE C. EAos & MicHAEL FIX, RELIEF OR REFoRM?: REAGAN's
REGULATORY DD..EMMA (1984).
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good government cohesively-a vision which coincidentally involved the
government speaking in a unitary voice personified by the President. In
addition to aggressively advancing its social agenda through the courts, the
administration also openly urged the judiciary to practice judicial
restraint. 164 Not surprisingly, dual presentations from agencies and the
Solicitor General declined during this period as efforts by the Attorney
General to oversee Solicitor General advocacy increased. 165
Direct White House and Attorney General participation in Supreme
Court advocacy should not be overstated. Aside from the natural tendency
to let subordinate officials act independently, White House involvement is
also lessened by the powerful disincentives of undermining the Solicitor
General's effectiveness before the Court and spurring on Congress to pass
statutes exempting independent and perhaps executive agencies from
Solicitor General control. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Attorney
General supervises the Solicitor General and that the President supervises
the Attorney General. These clients hire the Solicitor General to be their
representative, and they have the power to fire the Solicitor General. When
either the White House or the Attorney General directs the Solicitor General
to reverse his position, he complies. "When that happens," as Charles Fried
explained at his confirmation hearing, "it would be peevish and inappropriate, for the Solicitor General to be anything but cheerful in accepting that
reversal." 166 Representing administration policy, in Rex Lee's words, is
simply "a part of [the] job." 167 The Solicitor General's obligation, like that
of other Executive Branch attorneys, "is most reasonably seen as running to
the Executive Branch as a whole and to the President as its head." 168 "He is
unique ... because of his duty to an individual-the President-who has a
constitutional responsibility to interpret the law independently from the
Supreme Court." 169
The Solicitor General's status as part of the Executive Branch, however, is not at all inconsistent with the apparent independence that most
Solicitors General exercise. First, Presidents appoint Solicitors General
164. See William F. Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A. J. 59,59 (1982) (announcing the
Reagan Justice Department's "undertaking [of] a conscious effort to encourage judicinl restraint");
Steven Markman, Judicial Selection: The Reagan Years (stating that Reagan "was detennined to appoint
to the federal courts only those individunls who are committed to the rule of law''), reprinted in FisHER
& DEVINs, supra note 62, at 204.
165. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 81-134 (describing the Solicitor Genernl's working relationship
with Attorney General Edwin Meese and Assistant Attorney General William Bradford Reynolds);
FRIED, supra note 7, at 40-54 (same). For defenses of Reagan Administration intervention as typicnl,
see Clegg, supra note 9, at 967; Albert Lauber, Jr., An Exchange of Views: Has the Solicitor's Office
Become Politicized?, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 2, 1987, at 22, 23. For a suggestion that dual representations
were rare under Fried because Fried himself perceived his role as the ultimate interpreter of the law
within the government, see McGinnis, supra note 9, at 803·04.
166. SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 70.
167. Lee, supra note 15, at 599.
168. Miller, Government Lawyers' Ethics, supra note 16, at 1298.
169. McGinnis, supra note 9, at 802.
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whose personal views are compatible with the White House agenda.
Solicitors General, for the most part, advocate positions that the President
endorses or at least does not opposeP0 Second, direct White House and
Attorney General control is rare because executive officers typically are
allowed to put their programs in place and because of the risks of harming
Solicitor General relations with Congress and the Court. Third, since the
Solicitor General enhances his institutional strength by appearing independent of executive control, he, too, has an incentive not to appear to be the
Executive Branch's lackey.
Nevertheless, the appearance of independence is not independence.
This is not simply a matter of semantics. When Solicitor General "independence" is at odds with the White House or Attorney General, his client can
reign him in. When Solicitor General "independence" is at odds with
Congress or some independent agency, he cannot be ordered to reverse
course. Consequently, a lack of litigating authority places congressional
and independent agency autonomy at risk. Congress, of course, inherently
possesses and has statutorily granted itself such authority. Most independent agencies, however, are without this power. The next portion of this
study will examine the Solicitor General's representation of independent
agencies that lack independent litigating authority.

2.

The Solicitor General and Independent Agencies

Independent agency litigation poses special problems for the Solicitor
General. Unlike most governmental entities, independent agencies typically handle their own cases in lower federal courts. The Solicitor General,
therefore, reviews independent agency cases without the benefit of input
from Department of Justice lawyers who typically represent the government
in the lower courts. 171 More significantly, although Congress limits these
agencies' independence by entrusting their Supreme Court representation to
the Solicitor General, independent agencies nonetheless are empowered to
make policy decisions at odds with White House positions. The President
apparently lacks the power to remove commissioners of whose conclusions
170. Not surprisingly, when there is a change in administration, a new Solicitor General is typically
appointed. Moreover, with a new administration, the substance, objectives, and management of
Solicitor General advocacy change. The Supreme Court recognized in United States v. Mendoza, 464
U.S. 154, 161 (1984), that "the panoply of important pubHc issues raised in governmental litigation may
quite properly lead successive administrations of the Executive Branch to take differing positions with
respect to the resolution of a particular issue." For an extended discussion of Mendoza, see Joshua I.
Schwartz, Two Perspectives on the Solicitor General's Independence, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1119, 112351 (1988).
171. Department of Justice lawyers typically play a significant role in assisting the Solicitor
General to determine the cert-worthiness of governmental litigation. See HoRoWITZ, supra note 38, at
54-56. Donald Horowitz found that Department of Justice lawyers' recommendations not to seek
certiorari in cases where the government lost in federal courts of appeals were followed 99% of the time.
Id. at 57.
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he disapproves, 172 but he is free to tell the commissioners' lawyer, the
Solicitor General, whether the agencies' cases shall be pursued before the
Supreme Court and how they shall be presented before the Court. This
situation is delicate, and without question, the Solicitor General's record is
mixed. At times, an agency's position receives great deference; at other
times, the agency is accorded no deference. Sometimes, the Solicitor
General allows the agency to present its argument independently when a
conflict arises; sometimes, he shuts out the agency from the case.
The Solicitor General's office, for the most part, views independent
agency litigation as substantively different from purely executive representation. One difference concerns the frequency of seeking certiorari. The
Solicitor General seeks certiorari far more often in cases involving
independent agencies than in those involving executive agencies. In a 1966
study, William Brigman emphasized the Solicitor General's willingness to
pursue independent agency certiorari requests. 173 In 1973, Erwin Griswold
testified against legislation that would expand independent agency litigating
authority, in part because his office took great pains to advance agency
claims before the Supreme Court. Noting that the Solicitor General had
acceded to more than seventy-five percent of independent agency certiorari
requests (98 out of 128) from 1963-1973, Griswold argued that independent
agencies were especially well represented by his office. 174 Although these
figures do not account for a great number of cases where the Solicitor
General convinces an independent agency not to request certiorari, 175 and
although more recent figures suggest that there has been a significant drop
in the Solicitor General's independent agency certiorari requests, 176 the
172. Some scholars have argued that the President's constitutional duty to take care that the Jaws
are faithfully executed extends to the statutory removal of commissioners for good cause when those
commissioners frustrate presidential efforts to execute the Jaw as the President sees fit. See Interview
with Terry Eastland, supra note 5. See generally TERRY EASTLAND, ENEROY IN THE ExECUTJVB: THB
CASB FOR THE STRONO PRESIDENCY (1992).
173. See Brigman, supra note 104, at 120.
174. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 281 (statement of Solicitor General Erv1in
Griswold). Griswold presented the following figures:
No. of Deprivals
Agency
No. of Requests
Percentage
NLRB
FTC

FPC
CAB

62
28
26
3

48
18

24
1

FCC

1

1

SEC

8

6

77%

64%
93%
33%
100%
75%

128
Total
98
76.6%
175. One witness at the 1973 Hearings suggested that Griswold's figures were overstated because
''there would be very few instances in which the Solicitor General would be unable to persuade the
Commission to go along with his Office's judgment" !d. at 366 (statement of Professor Roy Schotland).
This conclusion is borne out by the FTC's current practice of following Solicitor General
recommendations in all but the most unusual of cases. See infra Part II.B.2.
176. See Todd Lochner, The Relationship Between the Office of Solicitor General and the
Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 19 VA. L. RBv~ 549, 576-77 (1993).
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Solicitor General gives independent agency requests a higher priority than
Executive Branch requests.
A second measure of the special status of independent agencies is the
Solicitor General's willingness to allow differences between independent
agencies and other parts of the government to be aired before the Supreme
Court. Solicitor General Griswold proclaimed that he tried "very hard to be
sure that [independent] agencies had an opportunity to have their views
before the Court," sometimes by indicating in a Solicitor General filing that
the independent agency holds a different view and sometimes by allowing
an independent agency to file a separate brief in its own name. 177 Other
Solicitors General have generally followed this approach. At one extreme,
Robert Stem (1952-1954) proclaimed that "[t]he Court is always appraised
of the intragovernmental conflict, and I know of no case in which the
Solicitor General has precluded an independent agency from presenting its
position.' 0178 The Carter Department of Justice likewise was careful "not to
interfere with the policy prerogatives of [its] agency clients" and was quite
willing to allow dual governmental representation. 179 At times, Archibald
Cox expressed similar sentiments. In responding to Justice Felix
Frankfurter's exasperation with the government's presentation of competing
independent agency and Solicitor General perspectives in the St. Regis case,
Cox meekly suggested that "if the dispute were only [with the Antitrust
Division of] the Justice Department, [he was] sure [he] could settle it." 180
Rex Lee, although perhaps seeking to deflect criticism for politicizing his
office, took pains in one controversial Consumer Product Safety
Commission case to state that his decision not to seek certiorari did "not
reflect any disagreement with the merit of the commission's decision.'' 181
In other matters, Lee both took note of conflicting agency positions in his
filings and authorized dual presentations. 182
Independent agencies fare better in the Solicitor General's office than
other governmental litigants. Their cases are pursued more often, and their
differences with the Solicitor General are more likely to be presented before
the Court. Especially when the independent agency is a named party, the
Solicitor General's office typically views an independent agency as its prin177. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 290 (testimony of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold).
178. Stem, supra note 3, at 157.
179. Bell, supra note 135, at 1061.
180. JAMES E. CLAYTON, THE MAKINo OF JusncE 155 (1964) (quoting St. Regis oral argument).
181. Letter from Solicitor General Rex E. Lee to Nancy H. Steorts, Chair, Consumer Product
Safety Commission, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1983, at A13. For further discussion of this
issue, see Molly Sinclair, 7-Year Fight to Ban Foam Comes to an End, WASH. PoST, Aug. 26, 1983, at

07.
182. See infra note 235 and accompanying text (identifying two of Lee's disputes with the EEOC);
infra text accompanying notes 194-97 (discussing Lee's approval of dual Solicitor General-SEC
presentations in Dirks v. SEC).
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cipal client. 183 While the Solicitor General may seek to moderate the
independent agency's position because of competing agency or executive
interests,l 84 he rarely tosses aside the independent agencies' views. Thls
special status is sometimes considered a nuisance, but it exists.
Sensitivity to agency interests, of course, is not the same as uniformly
vigorous advocacy on behalf of independent agency litigants. The Solicitor
General must cautiously select and present cases to balance the interests of
independent agencies and their oversight committees, White House policy
priorities, the interests of other parts of the Executive Branch-especially
other divisions within the Department of Justice-and the need to protect
litigating capital with the Supreme Court. In some instances, this balancing
act is responsive to independent agency concerns. Sometimes, however, the
Solicitor General subordinates agency concerns to pursue some other
agenda. A comparison of Solicitor General management of SEC, FCC, and
EEOC litigation reveals the variability of Solicitor General representation.

a.

The SEC

Solicitor General relations with the SEC have been quite positive. 185
Congress declined to grant the SEC independent litigating authority in 1973
in large measure because Erwin Griswold presented, and the SEC did not
oppose, a convincing case for the adequacy of Solicitor General representation.186 In the early 1980s, the SEC passed on a congressional invitation to
revisit the independent litigating authority issue. 187 Up through the tenure
of President Reagan's first Solicitor General, Rex Lee, the Solicitor General
presented SEC positions to the Supreme Court. 188 When differences arose,
the SEC position was either noted by the Solicitor General or independently
183. Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra note 5; Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5.
184. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 274 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold); John A. Jenkins, The Solicitor General's Winning Ways, 69 A.B.A. J. 734, 738 (1983)
(discussing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982)); Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra
note 5; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4.
185. This is the unanimous view of current and former SEC officials as well as officials within the
Solicitor General's office. See, e.g., Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 282-84 (statement of
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold) (explaining the few instances in which the Solicitor General declined
to file petitions for certiorari on behalf of the SEC); Daniel L. Goelzer, General Counsel, Securities and
Exchange Commission, Address to the American Bar Association Committee on Federal Regulation of
Securities 6 (Nov. 19, 1988) (transcript on file with author) (maintaining that the Solicitor General has
been deferential to SEC views); see also Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4; Interview with Ken
Geller, supra note 5; Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 92-94.
187. Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4.
188. Former SEC General Counsel Daniel Goelzer, while not critical of Charles Fried's
management of the Solicitor General's office, perceived that Fried was less interested in representing
SEC concerns than was Rex Lee. Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4; see also infra text
accompanying notes 200-02 (discussing CIS v. Dynamics litigation). Bush Solicitor General Ken Starr
seems to have followed Fried's lead. This is reflected in Starr's handling of Chicago Mercantile Exch.
v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990). See infra text accompanying
notes 204-08.
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presented by the agency. In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
Daniel, the SEC filed an amicus brief supporting a worker's claim that
involuntary noncontributory pension plans were entitled to federal securities protections. 189 The Department of Labor and the Solicitor General,
who disagreed with this interpretation, filed a separate amicus brief on this
point. 190 Another example of the Solicitor General's accomodation of SEC
concerns was Marine Bank v. Weaver, 191 where the Solicitor General
crafted a compromise to resolve an intragovemmental dispute between the
Commission and bank regulatory agencies. 192
Dirks v. SEC193 presented a more striking example of Solicitor
General willingness to accommodate SEC concerns. In Dirks, the SEC
claimed that improperly fostering trading need not involve wrongfully
obtained inside information. 194 In contrast, the Solicitor General argued
that the disclosure of information legally available to others was not subject
to sanction. 195 At the certiorari stage, the Solicitor General allowed the
SEC to argue its position separately. Rather than file a separate petition, the
Solicitor General added a footnote to the SEC petition stating his view that
the SEC position was in error. 196 After the Court granted certiorari, the
SEC continued to represent its interests in the case, including the presentation of oral arguments. The Solicitor General filed an amicus brief opposing the SEC interpretation but acceded to the SEC's request that his brief
include "some generalized statements of support for the agency's insider
trading enforcement program." 197 This deference is partially explained by
the fact that the SEC was the named party in the case. Yet, the Solicitor
General's willingness to moderate his own brief to assuage agency fears of
dual representation was truly extraordinary.
SEC-Solicitor General relations have changed slightly in recent years.
From 1986 to 1993, the Solicitor General's office became more restrictive,
paying less attention to agency priorities in advancing the Solicitor
General's vision of the government's position. 198 Although relations
between the SEC and the Solicitor General remained good, dual filings and
the acknowledgment of competing SEC perspectives in the Solicitor
189. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae, International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (No. 77-754).
190. See Motion of the United States for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Daniel (No. 77-754).
191. 455 u.s. 551 (1982).
192. Jenkins, supra note 184, at 738.
193. 463 u.s. 646 (1983).
194. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission, Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983)
(No. 82-276).
195. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal, Dirks (No. 82-276).
196. See Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission in Opposition at 17 n.*, Dirks (No. 82276).
197. Jenkins, supra note 184, at 738. For an overview of Dirks, see Justice Department Breaks
with SEC on Dirks' Equity Funding Censure, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) at A-3 (Oct 29, 1982).
198. See Interview with Dan Goelzer, supra note 4.
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General's filings diminished. In the 1987 CTS v. Dynamics 199 litigation,
the Solicitor General agreed with the SEC that the Indiana Control Share
Acquisition Act violated the Commerce Clause but disagreed with the
SEC's assertion that the law also failed under federal preemption doctrine.200 On the Commerce Clause issue, the Solicitor General stated that
"[t]he Commission and the United States believe ... that the Chapter violates the Commerce Clause."201 On the preemption issue, rather than note
the SEC's competing view, the brief simply asserted that "[t]he United
States believes that the Indiana Chapter is not preempted by the Williams
Act." 202 A careful reader of the brief might infer that mention to the
"United States" and not "the Commission and the United States" signalled
SEC disapproval of the preemption argument. Apparently, to secure
Solicitor General representation, the SEC had to accept the "compromise"
of having only arguments endorsed by the Solicitor General presented to the
Court.
The Solicitor General did not offer the SEC a compromise in Chicago
Mercantile Exchange v. SEC, 203 a 1990 lawsuit which involved the SEC's
grant of permission to stock exchanges to trade so-called "index participations" as securities.204 The Commodities Future Trading Commission
(CFTC) successfully disputed this SEC interpretation before the Seventh
Circuit, arguing that "index participations" were commodities subject to
CFTC, not SEC, regulation. 205 The Solicitor General agreed with the
CFTC and opposed the granting of certiorari, although the SEC was a
named party to the litigation.Z06 The Solicitor General stated in his brief,
''While the SEC's views about its statute and the industry it regulates are
entitled to weight, we cannot agree with the SEC that the decision below is
incorrect ... in dividing authority between the SEC and CFTC."207 The
SEC was not allowed to file a separate brief. Instead, the Solicitor
General's filing summarized and discredited the SEC's views. 208
199. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
200. See Goelzer, supra note 185, at 6-7.
201. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States as Amici Curine at 3,
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (No. 86-71).
202. /d.
203. 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936 (1990).
204. "Index participations are contracts of indefinite duration based on the value of n basket (index)
of securities. The seller of an IP ... promises to pay the buyer the value of the index as measured on n
'cash-out day.'" Id. at 539.
205. See Brief for the Commodities Future Trading Commission as Amicus Curine, Chicago
Mercantile Exch. v. SEC, 883 F.2d 537 (7th Cir. 1989) (No. 89-1528), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 936
(1990).
206. See Brief for the Federnl Respondent in Opposition, American Stock Exch., Inc. v. Chicago
Mercantile Exch., 496 U.S. 936 (1990) (No. 89-1502).
207. /d. at 8.
208. See id. at 20 ("[P)etitioners and the SEC have cited the provision .•. known as the 'SEC
savings clause.' That provision does not, in our view, justify limiting the CFTC's jurisdiction over IPs."
(citations omitted)).
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While occasionally disappointed by the Solicitor General, the SEC
nonetheless endorses the current arrangement. Former General Counsel
Dan Goelzer explained why: "[T]he Solicitor General is almost invariably
deferential to the Commission's views. It is extremely rare that the
Solicitor General has flatly opposed the Commission's urging a position it
wanted to take."209 The experiences of recent years, however, reveal that
the Solicitor General is willing to prevent the SEC from advancing a position at odds with his own.
b.

The FCC

FCC relationships with the Solicitor General are difficult to characterize because of an extraordinarily confusing statutory scheme. This scheme
sometimes allows the FCC to appeal cases directly to the Supreme Court,
sometimes makes the FCC entirely dependent on Department of Justice
attorneys throughout the course of litigation, and sometimes authorizes
FCC representation before federal courts of appeals and Solicitor General
representation before the Supreme Court.210 As a result, the type of case
defines Solicitor General-FCC relationships.
FCC views are accorded the least weight when Department of Justice
attorneys represent the FCC throughout the course of litigation. These
cases originate in federal district court and include enforcement actions
brought by the Commission as well as employment discrimination and
Freedom of Information Act suits filed against the Commission. Although
FCC and Department of Justice attorneys typically work together in preparing pleadings and other legal memoranda in these cases, policy-based disputes occasionally arise. One such dispute involved the League of Women
Voters' challenge to a statutory prohibition of public television and radio
station editorials, culminating in the Supreme Court's 1982 FCC v. League
of Women Voters 211 decision. When the suit was first filed in 1979, the
FCC and the Carter Justice Department concluded that the editorial ban was
unconstitutional. The government filed motions in federal district court
stating that it would not defend the ban's constitutionality.212 However,
two critical events reinvigorated League of Women Voters and precluded its
dismissal.2 13 First, Congress amended the editorial ban rule so that it would
apply only to public television and radio stations that receive federally
funded Corporation of Public Broadcasting grants? 14 Second, the Reagan
Administration assumed office, and the Department of Justice softened its
209. Goelzer, supra note 185, at 6.
210. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
211. 468 U.S. 364 (1984), overruled by Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
212. See League of Women Voters v. FCC, 547 F. Supp. 379, 381 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
213. The case was kept alive by the Senate Legal Counsel, who moved to intervene in the case and
defend the Senate's interest in the constitutionality of the editorial ban. See id. at 381.
214. Public Broadcasting Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, ch. 1, 95 Stat 725, 725-36.
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position on the constitutionality of editorial bans.215 Disregarding the
FCC's unchanged position, the Reagan Department of Justice unilaterally
pursued the case from beginning to end. When the Supreme Court rejected
the Department's defense of the ban and struck down the amended statute,
the FCC rejoiced, calling the decision "a significant breakthrough."216
In sharp contrast to such instances of Department of Justice control
stand cases where the FCC holds a statutory right to seek certiorari before
the Supreme Court in appeals of FCC declaratory orders. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation 211 and FCC v. MCI Telecommunications Corp. 218 typify such
cases. In both instances, the FCC and Solicitor General each presented
their divergent views as statutory litigants before the Supreme Court. In
Pacifica, the FCC successfully argued that certain words could be kept off
the airwaves for most broadcasting hours while the Solicitor General challenged the FCC order as overbroad because the Commission did not consider "the context in which the offending words were used." 219 MCI
concerned an FCC order mandating that AT&T had no obligation to interconnect its facilities with those of MCI. The D.C. Circuit invalidated this
order. The FCC petitioned for certiorari, and the Solicitor General filed a
petition in opposition. 220 The Court denied certiorari, but the case is noteworthy because of a blistering footnote in the FCC brief "question[ing]
exactly what interests of the United States the Solicitor legitimately represents in this case."221
Licensing decisions, handled by the FCC before federal appellate
courts and by the Solicitor General before the Supreme Court, involve a
murkier division of responsibility. Sometimes, the Solicitor General
resolves disputes with the FCC simply by refusing to petition the Supreme
Court for certiorari;222 other times, the Solicitor General authorizes the FCC
215. See Brief for the United States, FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) (No.
89-912); see also Kathleen Sylvester, Editorial Freedom Case Set for Court's Calendar, NAT'L L.J.,
Mar. 14, 1983, at 5.
216. Fred Barbash, High Court Rules for Public TV: Right to Comment Upheld Despite Federal
Funding, WAsH. PoST, July 3, 1984, at Al (quoting FCC General Counsel Bruce Fein).
217. 438 u.s. 726 (1978).
218. 439 u.s. 980 (1978).
219. Brief for the United States at 14, FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (No. 77-528).
But cf. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8, Pacifica (No. 77-528) (''The [FCC's] order seeks to protect
parental and privacy interests . . . to the extent that this Court's constitutional opinions pennit."
(footnote omitted)).
220. See Brief for the United States in Opposition, United States Indep. Tel. Ass'n v. United States,
439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-216); Petitioner's Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition,"
FCC v. MCI Telecommunieations Corp., 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (No. 78-270).
221. Petitioner's Reply to "Brief for the United States in Opposition" at 1 n.l, MCI (No. 78-270).
222. An example of Justice's willingness to exercise this authority involved FCC "must-ciiil)'"
rules, which required cable companies to CIIIl)' local television signals. The Department perceived these
rules as unconstitutional, and the Solicitor General, therefore, refused the FCC's request to petition the
Supreme Court to review an appeals court decision striking down these rules. See Government Won't
Appeal Must Carry, BROADCASTING, Mar. 28, 1988, at 37.
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to present its divergent views without Solicitor General interference.223
These decisions are especially dependent upon the specific circumstances
surrounding them.
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 224 decided by the Supreme Court in
1990, exemplifies such fact-specific litigation. Metro Broadcasting called
into question the constitutionality of FCC preferences and set-asides to
increase the number of minority broadcasters. The case was a political battlefield. In response to FCC efforts to reexamine its affirmative action programs during the Reagan Administration, Congress had enacted
prohibitions on FCC preference policy reconsideration. 225 The FCC, therefore, could not argue in its own name that its preference scheme was constitutionally suspect. Bush Solicitor General Kenneth Starr's (1989-1993)
commitment to Reagan Administration challenges to affirmative action further complicated this highly visible litigation. The FCC and the Solicitor
General jointly opposed the granting of certiorari226 in an attempt to throw
this politically hot issue back to Congress and to the D.C. Circuit, where
new judicial appointments might resolve an apparent intracircuit conflict.227
This would also enable the Solicitor General to avoid having to decide
whether to allow the FCC to assert its position independently before the
Court.228 Finally, for supporters of preferences within the FCC and the
Solicitor General's office, this strategy would prevent the Court from hearing a case that most thought would place another nail in the affirmative
action coffin.229
Certiorari was granted, however. The Solicitor General was set to file
a brief challenging the constitutionality of FCC preferences but still faced
the question of whether to allow the FCC to file separately. By this time,
the Commission strongly supported the preference program, thanks to
President Bush's appointment of three pro-preference commissioners.230
Perhaps because the Solicitor General's office was sensitive to the FCC's
precarious position with Congress, perhaps because it feared that the FCC
would claim independent litigating authority to argue the case, or perhaps
223. This is precisely what occurred in FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775 (1978). Here, Carter Solicitor General Wade McCree resolved a dispute between the
Department of Justice and the FCC by allowing the FCC to present its position to the Court. See Brief
for Petitioner, FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (No. 76-1471).
The Department of Justice's views were presented in a separate brief. See Brief for the United States,
National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting (No. 76-1471). For further discussion of this conflict, see
FCC Cross-Media Ban Backed, FAcrs oN Fll.E WoRLD NEWs Dra., June 23, 1978, at 467.
224. 497 u.s. 547 (1990).
225. See Neal Devins, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Requiem for a Heavyweight, 69 TEX. L.
REv. 125, 138-41 (1990).
226. See Brief for the Federal Respondent in Opposition, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497
U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453).
227. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Daniel Armstrong, supra note 4.
228. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5.
229. ld.
230. See Devins, supra note 225, at 152-53.
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because the political repercussions were not worth the costs, the Solicitor
General permitted the FCC to defend its preferences independently before
the Court.231 The agency did so successfully. One observation is clear:
Solicitor General-FCC relations were defmed by the specific circumstances
of the case at the certiorari stage and at the time the case came before the
Court.232
Metro Broadcasting, MCI, Pacifica, and League of Women Voters do
not lend themselves to sweeping generalizations about Solicitor General
involvement in FCC litigation. Rather, they suggest that variable presentation schemes and factual circumstances defme this relationship.

c.

The EEOC

The Solicitor General-EEOC relationship presents an example of
extreme infringement on agency independence. The Solicitor General
today refuses to recognize the EEOC as an independent agency. While the
EEOC may influence Solicitor General decisionmaking on a given issue, 233
the Solicitor General seems disinclined to allow the EEOC to advance competing arguments before the Supreme Court. This practice is a relatively
new one. During the Carter years, the Solicitor General allowed the EEOC
to file briefs at odds with his positions.234 During Reagan's first term,
Solicitor General Rex Lee took note of disagreements between his office
and the EEOC. 235 In recent years, however, the Solicitor General has freely
231. See Brief for Federal Communications Commission at 1, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,
497 U.S. 547 (1990) (No. 89-453). The Solicitor General filed a brief arguing that the diversity
preference was unconstitutional. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Metro Broadcasting (No. 89-453). It is less obvious why Solicitor General Starr authorized
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) to file nn nmicus brief opposing the
Department of Labor in Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991). See Motion for Leave to File Brief for
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents,
Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144 (1991) (No. 89-1541). By authorizing this filing, OSHRC was able to
challenge the Solicitor General's representations that the Department of Labor, not the OSHRC, was
empowered to definitively interpret an ambiguous regulation promulgated by the Secretruy of Labor
under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. According to OSHRC Gcnernl Counsel Earl
Ohman, there was no controversy over the Solicitor General's granting of OSHRC'S request to file an
nmicus brief. Telephone Interview with Earl Ohman, General Counsel, OSHRC (Dec. 2, 1993).
232. The fact-specific nature of Solicitor General-FCC relations is also revealed in the joint
decision of the Solicitor General and FCC not to seck certiorari in Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382
(1992), where the D.C. Circuit refused to extend Metro Broadcasting to gender preferences. For further
discussion of this case, see Neal Devins, Congress, the FCC, and the Search for the Public Trustee, 56
LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss., Autumn 1993, nt 145.
233. In Patterson v. McClean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), EEOC ndvocncy before the
Solicitor General's office helped shnpe the government's nmicus filing. Interview with Charles Shanor,
supra note 4.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 115-16 (discussing separate filing by EEOC in Personnel

Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney).
235. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curine in Support of Petitioners at 24 n.23,
Frrefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 464 U.S. 808 (1983) (No. 82-206) (''The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission disagrees with this interpretation of Section 706(g) and believes
that its adoption might call into question numerous extant consent decrees and conciliation agreements
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disregarded competing EEOC perspectives-even in cases where the EEOC
is a party.236
The demise of the EEOC's relationship with the Solicitor General
began with Congress' 1964 decision to give the EEOC significantly less
independence than other independent agencies. Republican leadership,
believing that EEOC cease and desist power would prove ruinous to business interests, limited the EEOC to a strictly advisory role. 237 The
Department of Justice controlled government-initiated employment discrimination litigation. In 1972, Congress granted the EEOC independent
litigating authority but not cease and desist authority. 238 Moreover,
Congress limited the agency's independent litigating authority in two significant respects. First, the Department of Justice retained exclusive control
of suits against state and local governments.239 Second, the Department of
Justice, through the Solicitor General's office, controlled EEOC Supreme
Court litigation. In 1974, the EEOC challenged Solicitor General control
by filing an amicus brief in a Supreme Court affirmative action case, De
Funis v. Odegaard, 240 without seeking Department of Justice approval.
Despite the EEOC's contention that "[i]ts independent character ... gives
it the same right as any other independent organization to ask the Court to
consider its views,"241 the Court refused to consider the brief, siding instead
with the Department of Justice's claim of plenary control of EEOC
Supreme Court litigation.242
The EEOC, therefore, lacked much of the power and prestige held by
most independent agencies. Other than its independent litigating authority
and the restrictions on presidential appointment and removal authority, the
to which the EEOC is party."); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at I n.*, Connecticut v.
Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (No. 80-2147) (noting that "[t]he EEOC has declined to join in this brief').
Justice Brennan, who rejected the Department of Justice's position in Teal, referred in his opinion to the
EEOC's refusal to sign onto the Department of Justice brief. 457 U.S. at 451 n.ll.
236. It is unclear whether Clinton Administration Solicitor General Drew Days will follow this
approach. In a telephone interview conducted before he was nominated as Solicitor General, Days told
me that he cautioned EEOC officials about a Carter Administration reorganization proposal, discussed
infra text accompanying note 251, precisely because it might make them vulnerable to Executive
Branch domination. Interview with Drew Days, supra note 5.
237. See generally HuGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 141-52 (1990).
238. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(b), -5(f)(l), (f)(2), (i), -6 (1988). For the politics behind this enactment,
see GRAHAM, supra note 237, at 420-49.
239. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l), (f)(2) (1988) (incorporating provisions of 1964 Civil Rights Act
and 1972 amendments).
312 (1974).
240. 416
241. Memorandum of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in Response to the
Department of Justice at 2, De Funis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (No. 73-295).
242. Solicitor General Robert Bork had earlier urged the Court to refuse the EEOC's unauthorized
submission. See Warren Weaver Jr., Law School's Plan to Aid Minorities Goes to High Court, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 25, 1974, at AI, Al3. The Supreme Court ultimately refused the EEOC brief, although
individuals attending oral argument in De Funis claim that some of the Justices took the EEOC brief to
oral argument Interview with Margaret Spencer, Former EEOC Attorney, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 8,
1992) (discussing her work on the De Funis case).

u.s.
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EEOC was without a significant independent voice. The Department of
Justice's Civil Rights Division, moreover, had great authority to enforce
separately and interpret employment discrimination laws. Adding to this
complexity, the Department of Justice's Civil Division, which represents
the government when it is sued in employment discrimination matters, also
had the power to interpret separately employment discrimination laws. This
combustible combination of concurrent authority exploded during the
Reagan Administration.
The triggering event occurred in Williams v. City of New Orleans, 243
where the EEOC intended to file before a federal appellate court an amicus
brief supporting race-conscious affirmative action. The EEOC draft brief
flatly contradicted an amicus brief that the Department of Justice Civil
Rights Division had already filed in the case. 244 Indeed, the EEOC characterized as "deplorable" the Justice Department's failure to consult the
EEOC before filing its amicus brief.245 While the EEOC saw the expression of conflicting views as producing "considerable public benefit,"246
Justice saw the EEOC brief as an outrageous challenge to the Civil Rights
Division's exclusive authority to manage employment discrimination lawsuits involving state and local government. In th<?. Civil Rights Division's
view, the government should speak with one voice in state and local
cases-the voice of the Civil Rights Division. To prove its point, the Civil
Rights Division claimed it would block the EEOC's attempts to file its amicus brief. 247
The EEOC ultimately capitulated and voted not to file an amicus brief
in Williams. 248 Direct White House and Attorney General pressure and the
fear of a losing court battle with the Civil Rights Division contributed to
243. 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984).
244. The Justice Department brief argued that the afftnnative action plan infringed on the rights of
"innocent nonblack employees." Justice Department Seeks to Overturn Promotion Plan for New
Orleans Police, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-8, A-9 (Jan. 10, 1983). The EEOC draft brief castigated
the Department of Justice for making this argument:
Contrary to this uniform body of case law approving the use of prospective employment
goals, however, the Department of Justice asks this Court to hold that judicial relief under
Title VII must be limited to ••• actual victims of discrimination ....
No court has accepted the Justice Department's construction of [the relevant title VII
section} ....
Draft EEOC Brief, Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1984) (No. 82-3435), reprinted in
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at E-1 (Apr. 6, 1983).
245. EEOC Chides Justice for "Deplorable" Action on New Orleans Police Case, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA), at A-2 (Feb. 1, 1983).
246. Fred Barbash & Juan Williams, Administration Prods EEOC on Quotas Brief, WAsH. PoST,
Apr. 7, 1983, at AI (quoting EEOC).
247. See EEOC Bows to White House Pressure, Says It Won't File New Orleans Brief, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) at A-6, A-7 (Apr. 6, 1983).
248. See id. at A-6.
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this decision. 249 Ironically, the appellate court in Williams made repeated
reference to the EEOC's draft brief after receiving a leaked copy of the
brief through another amicus brief.250 The EEOC lost a much larger battle
with the Solicitor General as a consequence of Williams. During the
Williams controversy, the Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion supporting the Civil Rights Division. This opinion went beyond the state and
local authority issue and asserted that a Carter Administration reorganization, transferring authority from the Departments of Justice and Labor to the
EEOC, de facto made the EEOC an executive agency "subject to the supervision and control of the President."251 For the Solicitor General's office,
this memo settled the issue of EEOC independence.252
Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n v. EEOCZS 3
proved to be the culmination for the Solicitor General, if not for the
EEOC's oversight committees in Congress, of the transplant of the EEOC
into the Executive Branch. Although the EEOC, a party in the case, had
successfully defended federal court authority to order affirmative action hiring in an employment discrimination lawsuit,254 the Solicitor General unilaterally reversed the Commission's position in a brief it filed on the
Commission's behalf before the Supreme Court.255 That the EEOC was a
party in the case mattered little to the Solicitor General. Charles Fried, in
his autobiography Order and Law, did not even mention the EEOC in his
account of the case.256 Moreover, when the EEOC explained its position to
Solicitor General attorneys, it was flatly told that it was a part of the
Executive Branch and would have to swallow Department of Justice opposition to affirmative action. 257 The only concession offered by the Solicitor
General was opposing certiorari in the case so that the Court could resolve
the Sheet Metal Workers issue in two analogous cases already before the
249. Following the decision to withdraw, EEOC Chairman Clarence Thomas commented that the
Commission was strongly influenced by the argument that it had no legal authority in public sector
employment discrimination lawsuits. See Barbash & Williams, supra note 246, at A9.
250. See Williams v. New Orleans, 729 F.2d 1554, 1571 n.1, 1572 n.S (1984) (Wisdom, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. The OLC opinion is described in Report by House Committee on Government Operations on
EEOC Handling of Sex-Based Wage Discrimination, reprinted in Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at D-1, D-4
(May 25, 1984).
252. Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra note 5; Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5.
253. 478 u.s. 421 (1986).
254. EEOC v. Local 638 •.. Local28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'1 Ass'n, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d
Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 421 (1986).
255. See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986) (No. 84-1656). Remarkably, then-Acting EEOC
General Counsel Johnny J. Butler signed this brief. Butler, however, claimed in an interview that he and
the EEOC vigorously opposed the Solicitor General's position. Interview with Johnny J. Butler, supra
note 4. It is difficult to say whether Butler sought to win favor with Reagan Administration officials
through his signature or whether he honestly felt obligated to sign on to the brief. Whatever the
explanation, Butler and the EEOC did not alter their views on the permissibility of affirmative action.
256. See FRIED, supra note 7, at 110-16.
257. Interview with Johnny J. Butler, supra note 4.
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Court.258 It is unclear whether the Solicitor General made this concession
to accord some respect to EEOC positions or whether he feared the repercussions of entirely disregarding EEOC views. Once the Court granted certiorari, however, EEOC prerogatives played no apparent role in the
Solicitor General's handling of the case.259
· Sheet Metal Workers is an extreme example of the Solicitor General's
discounting of EEOC autonomy, but it is not an anomaly. In Riverside v.
Rivera, 260 the Solicitor General rejected EEOC efforts to participate as an
amicus supporting respondents' claims in an attorney's fees case.261
Instead, the Solicitor General filed an amicus brief in opposition to respondents' claims without mentioning the EEOC's conflicting position. 262
Ironically, EEOC arguments were ultimately presented to the Court. The
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund reproduced in its amicus filing
a leaked draft of the EEOC memorandum recommending its participation as
amicus curiae in support of respondents. 263 Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins 264 offers another recent example of Solicitor General unwillingness to note EEOC differences. In that case, the Solicitor General did not
note EEOC disagreement with his view that an employer could rebut evidence of sexual stereotyping by a preponderance of the evidence rather than
by clear and convincing evidence.265
Several factors explain the demise of EEOC independence relative to
the Solicitor General. To start, the EEOC is vulnerable to attack because it
lacks cease and desist authority and other significant attributes of independence. Moreover, during the Reagan years, three divisions of the
Department of Justice took direct aim at the EEOC. The Civil Rights
Division openly challenged EEOC authority in the Williams case, arguing
that conflicting EEOC interpretations undercut the Division's ability to
advance effectively its interpretation of Title VII in state and local government cases. The Civil Division, in order to defend effectively employment
discrimination suits filed against the government, advanced arguments that
258. See Brief for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission at 9, Sheet Metal Workers (No.
84-1656) ("respectfully request[ing the] Court to hold the present case pending disposition of
Vanguards and Wygant").
259. At the time Sheet Metal Workers was argued before the Court, a high-ranking EEOC officinl
suggested to me that Justice's disregard of EEOC prerogatives was not necessarily unwelcome.
260. 477 u.s. 561 (1986).
261. See Justice Department Rejects EEOC Advice, Seeks Limit on Lawyer Fees in Rig/1ts Cases,
Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A-1 (Jan. 9, 1986).
262. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Riverside v. Rivero,
477 U.S. 561 (1986) (No. 85-224).
263. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. in Support
of Respondents, Rivera (No. 85-224).
264. 490 u.s. 228 (1989).
265. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23 n.IO, Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167). Respondent's attorneys noted this omission in their brief: ''The
Solicitor General's failure to comment on EEOC's position ••. is curious." Brief for Respondent nt 42
n.32, Price Waterhouse (No. 87-1167).
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were at odds with pro-plaintiff EEOC interpretations.266 Finally, the Office
of Legal Counsel joined this fray by declaring the EEOC an executive
agency. These three divisions exerted far more influence on their
Department of Justice brethren in the Solicitor General's office than did the
EEOC.267
The decline of EEOC authority relative to the Solicitor General is an
extreme and atypical case. The Carter reorganization, by placing clearly
executive functions within the EEOC, transformed the EEOC into a hybrid
between an independent and an executive agency. More significantly, the
Civil Division and Civil Rights Division both have power to interpret
employment discrimination legislation in statutorily designated spheres of
authority. The erosion of EEOC independence before the Solicitor General
is nonetheless striking. Empowered to argue cases before federal district
and appellate courts,268 the EEOC routinely finds its views withheld from
the Supreme Court when they diverge from the views of the Solicitor
General.

* * * *

The experiences of the SEC, FCC, and EEOC reveal the variable character of Solicitor General-independent agency relations. While no
independent agency is immune to having its views ignored, some agencies
receive far more respect than others. Factors that explain this variable treatment include the following: the likelihood of agency positions conflicting
with other government positions, especially those of the Department of
Justice; the willingness of Congress to intercede statutorily on an agency's
behalf; the sweep of independent litigatip.g authority, cease and desist
authority, and other powers which empower an independent agency and
insulate it from the Executive Branch; and the likelihood that independent
agency action conflicts with White House agenda items.269 With reference
to these factors, one would expect the EEOC to fare far worse than the FCC
and SEC.
That the Solicitor General, a political appointee, is influenced by political circumstances comes as no surprise.27 Concerns over Solicitor

°

266. In Turner v. Orr, 759 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1985), for example, the Civil Division advanced
arguments identical to those of the Civil Rights Division and contrary to those of the EEOC in its efforts
to defend the Air Force from the terms of an affirmative action consent decree.
267. See HoROWITZ, supra note 38, at 54-60 (explaining that recommendations by Justice
Department attorneys carry more weight than recommendations by agencies); Brigman, supra note 104,
at 129 (discussing the power of Department of Justice divisions to shape Solicitor General positions).
268. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4(b), -5(f)(l), -5(f)(2), -5(i), -6 (1988).
269. Another factor is the quality of agency representation. Rex Lee, for example, noted that the
Solicitor General often "give[s] deference to those people that we know will perform their own
screening functions." SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 84 (quoting Rex Lee). Under Lee, the Solicitor
General's office often deferred to NLRB recommendations because "[w]e knew that they were the ones
that had done a very careful job and had done good lawyering before they sent us the
recommendations.'' ld.
270. This sensitivity to political circumstances dates back to the rise of the administrative state. "A
study of all requests by the [independent] commissions for review over a five year period from July,
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General politicization led to mid-seventies legislative reform efforts involving the Justice Department itself and agencies such as the FfC and SEC.271
Lincoln Caplan's The Tenth Justice accused the Reagan Administration of
placing its political agenda ahead of supposed Solicitor General independence.272 A 1992 study of the Solicitor General likewise concluded that
"[a]lthough solicitors general enjoy a functional autonomy from the administration, this independence does not translate into substantive freedom
from the policies and politics of the White House."273
This perception of the Solicitor General as a political agent is problematic not just for independent agencies but for the Solicitor Gener~ himself.
For some Solicitors General, balancing agency independence concerns
against the traditional measures of a case's cert-worthiness creates a catch22. On one hand, Solicitors General may take a great deal of heat for not
seeking certiorari. For example, consumer groups attacked as political foul
play a 1983 Solicitor General decision not to seek certiorari to defend a
Consumer Product Safety Commission ban on urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation.274 On the other hand, Solicitors General such as Erwin
Griswold have deferred to agency independence by seeking certiorari in a
disproportionate number of independent agency cases.275 In some of these
cases, an agency's independence determines whether the Solicitor General
seeks certiorari. The Solicitor General, in these cases, is not always speaking his mind on the case's cert-worthiness.
Politics tells only part of the story. SEC, FCC, and EEOC experiences
also reveal that Solicitor General attitudes toward independent agencies
change significantly from administration to administration. As a result,
independent agency autonomy likewise will ebb and flow. Wade McCree
preferred to allow dual governmental representation rather than have his
office trump independent agency desires. He claimed that it was "essential"
for the Solicitor General ''to avoid any appearance of formulating 'policy'
for the agencies." 276 Rex Lee took a more lawyerly approach, noting
independent agency disagreements in Solicitor General filings and allowing
independent agencies to separately argue cases in which they were a
1957, through June, 1962, shows that denial of access to the Supreme Court is no mere threat and that it
is based, to a significant degree, on policy considerations." Brigman, supra note 104, at 120; see also
id. at 130 (discussing a policy dispute between the Department of Justice and the Federal Maritime
Commission in Federal Maritime Bd. v. Pacific Far East Line, lnc., 363 U.S. 827 (1960)). For further
discussion of the partisan nature of Solicitor General advocacy, see Lochner, supra note 176, at 562-65.
271. See, e.g., STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 54-67; Politics Hearings, supra
note 13, at 3; Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 272-92 (testimony and statement of Solicitor
General Erwin Griswold).
272. CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 277 ("[O]ne of the great misdeeds of the Reagan Administration
was to diminish the institution that .•. once stood for the nation's commitment to the rule of law.").
273. SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 175.
274. See David Shribman, Foam Insulation is Cleared of Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1983, nt A-1.
275. See supra note 174.
276. McCree, supra note 162, nt 345.
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party.277 Lee, although a strong believer of the Solicitor General's responsibility to further presidential priorities, acknowledged that the Solicitor
General, as a "litigating lawyer, ... is an advocate for a client whose objective is to achieve the most favorable result possible in that particular
case."27s
In contrast, Charles Fried, believing that the government should speak
as one through the Solicitor General, strongly disfavored dual presentations
or any acknowledgment of conflict. Fried saw himself as the kingpin of
government litigation before the Supreme Court. He was "appointed to
exercise [his] judgment," and he perceived public office to be "an interpretive activity."279 Fried once informed NLRB General Counsel Rosemary
Collyer that he would "'plead error on behalf of the government'" were the
Board to file a case without his approval.280 Indeed, even in the rare case
where he authorized an independent agency to present its views to the
Court, Fried made the independent agency pay a price. For example, in
allowing the U.S. Sentencing Commission to file a separate brief in
Mistretta v. United States, 281 Fried "succeed[ed] in getting the Commission to tone down its brief a little" by insisting that the Commission "back
off from using this as an occasion to establish" a theory of separation of
powers that Fried disfavored. 282
White House desires, statutory grants of authority, political circumstances, and Solicitor General philosophies all contribute to the Solicitor
General's uneven representation of independent agency interests. Although
the Solicitor General is often a dedicated advocate for independent agency
interests, he is ultimately an unreliable advocate. The Solicitor General
should not be faulted, for Congress created a system which places responsibility for independent agency litigation in the hands of an Executive Branch
official duty-bound to White House and Attorney General priorities. Under
this scheme, it is inevitable that conflicts will arise and that resolution of
those conflicts will often occur to the detriment of independent agency per277. See supra text accompanying notes 195, 235.
278. Lee, supra note 15, at 595.
279. FRIED, supra note 7, at 191.
280. Interview with Rosemary Collyer, supra note 4.
281. 488
361 (1989).
282. FRIED, supra note 7, at 168. Lincoln Caplan, therefore, goes too far in suggesting that Fried
embodied the Reagan Administration's politicization of the Solicitor General's office. See CAPLAN,
supra note 7, at 195-209, 264-67. In fact, Fried has been criticized for putting his principles of
interpretation ahead of those of the Reagan Administration. See McGinnis, supra note 9, at 803-04.
Nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that, when it came to complying with specific demands of the
Attorney General, Fried perceived the Attorney General to be his supervisor. On the question of the
constitutionality of independent agencies, for example, Fried remarked:
I did not come to my office committed to this program of submitting the independent agencies
to the President's power, but here more than anywhere else the Attorney General's attraction
to theoretical discussion had its effect. ... I was convinced. I had to be, since in the end this
battle would have to be waged by me in the Supreme Court."
FRIED, supra note 7, at 158.

u.s.
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spectives. While the Solicitor General does not want to risk losing the
power he holds under this scheme by persistently and outrightly defying
agency wishes, it is equally true that he need not view the independent
agencies whose Supreme Court litigation he controls as clients.

B.

The Solicitor General as Advocate

The Solicitor General, contrary to bureaucratic folklore, is not "a reliable, non-ideological and, essentially, non-political" advocate for the government before the Supreme Court.283 The experiences of the SEC, FCC, and
especially the EEOC attest to this conclusion. Nonetheless, most independent agency officials and attorneys in the Solicitor General's office perceive
that the benefits of Solicitor General representation outweigh the costs of
Solicitor General control.284 However, independent agency officials and
Solicitor General attorneys typically do not consider the viability of an
FfC-type hybrid arrangement where independent agencies may take control
of cases that the Solicitor General refuses to pursue on their behalf. This
hybrid structure preserves most of the advantages of Solicitor General representation without unduly restricting agency autonomy.
Solicitor General counsel provides significant benefits. Solicitor
General lawyers are extraordinarily able and skilled at Supreme Court
advocacy. The "skills, experience and knowledge that the office has gained
over many years"285 manifest themselves in a number of ways, including
superlative briefs and oral advocacy before the Court. Since the Solicitor
General's office limits its advocacy to a group of nine individuals, it has a
far better sense than most litigants about which buttons to push before the
Supreme Court.
Solicitor General advocacy also confronts the often difficult decision
whether or not to seek certiorari. Some cases contain "bad facts," and an
agency would, therefore, be "ill-advised to litigate in the Supreme Court an
important legal issue in a factual context in which the Court's sympathies
are likely to be with the other side."286 This "broader perspective and
greater objectivity'>287 save the independent agency from a potentially devastating Supreme Court decision. For independent agencies, this "perspective and objectivity" are a mixed blessing. The Solicitor General does not
283. Solicitor General Hearing, supra note 135, at 40 (testimony of Professor Burt Neubome).
284. Interview with Paul Gonson, supra note 4; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4;
Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5; Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; see also Exchange
Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 278-80 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin Griswold), 299 (statement
of SEC Commissioner Philip Loomis, Jr.).
285. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 279-80 {statement of Solicitor Genernl Erwin
Griswold).
286. ld. at 279. Charles Fried, too, has spoken of the dangers of "bad facts," referring to Sheet
Metal Workers as an "unattractive ... case in which to oppose preferences." FRIED, supra note 7, at
110. Current and fonner Deputy Solicitors General have also spoken of this danger. See Interview with
Ken Geller, supra note 5; Interview with Lawrence Wallace, supra note 5.
287. Stem, supra note 3, at 158.
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seek certiorari in many independent agency cases because he considers the
legal issue, while quite significant to the agency, relatively unimportant.
Although this screening function enhances the likelihood of success when
the Solicitor General pursues a case, it offers little solace to an independent
agency that is forced to take defeat on the chin.
The prospects that a particular case will not be deemed cert-worthy are
of significant but not overriding concern to independent agencies. The
issue presumably can be relitigated and, perhaps with a better set of facts or
some other development, the issue will ultimately be presented to the
Supreme Court. Yet when certiorari is not sought for political reasons or
when independent agency perspectives are tossed aside or severely limited
in cases presented to the Court, Solicitor General authority compromises
independent agency autonomy in a fundamental way. In such circumstances, independent agencies should be allowed to separately advance their
arguments before the Court-assuming, that is, that independent agencies
are constitutionally authorized to make policy decisions at odds with other
parts of the Executive Branch and the President.288
Some Solicitors and Attorneys General view proposals of this type as
heretical challenges to the Solicitor General's authority as the government's
spokesperson before the Supreme Court. Attorney General Tom Clark cautioned Congress against independent agency appeals before the Supreme
Court because "their objective [would] be so single-minded that they will
ignore ... the broad objectives of the United States."289 Solicitor General
Erwin Griswold likewise objected to independent agency autonomy saying
that "it would seriously affect the handling of the Government's legal work
before the Supreme Court." 290
These reactions are understandable but overstated. Limitations on
Solicitor General control do not necessarily undermine Solicitor General
authority. By allowing the Solicitor General to opt out of independent
agency litigation, the hybrid model serves Solicitor General interests without significantly intruding upon the ability to represent governmental interests before the Court. First, in cases where the Solicitor General either
agrees with the agency or can convince the agency of his position, Solicitor
General authority is unaffected. In these instances, the independent agency
benefits from Solicitor General counsel, and the Solicitor General protects
its government litigation prerogatives. Second, in cases where the Solicitor
General might feel constrained either to seek certiorari or to advance arguments with which he does not fully concur, the hybrid arrangement frees
him from involvement without the opprobrium of undermining agency
independence. Third, cases where the Solicitor General is castigated for
288. See infra Parts II.C.1, ill.
289. Schnapper, supra note 143, at 1259 n.225 (quoting Tom Clark) (alteration in original).
290. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 294 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold).
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giving short shrift to independent agency concerns will be less likely to
arise. Fourth, the Solicitor General will still present his views either explicitly or implicitly before the Court. Cases in which the Solicitor General
remains silent will send a signal to the Court that he does not support the
granting of certiorari; these signals are quite effective, as shown in a 1966
study of Solicitor General-ICC relations.291 More significantly, the
Solicitor General may express his views directly to the Court at either the
certiorari or argument phase .. To ensure that the Solicitor General's views
are presented to the Court, Congress could statutorily mandate his participation. Fifth, in presenting his views to the Court, the Solicitor General will
not be encumbered by the need to balance independent agency perspectives
in his litigation strategy. Instead, he may more easily wave the Executive
Branch banner before the Court.
The above projections are not merely idle speculation. The ICC, FEC,
and FTC all possess authority to represent themselves before the Supreme
Court. Their experiences with the Solicitor General and before the Court
speak to the workability of a hybrid litigation scheme.

1.

The ICC

ICC independent litigating authority dates back to 1910, with Congress
reaffirming that authority in 1975.292 For the most part, the ICC and
Solicitor General have worked cooperatively, preparing joint briefs in the
majority of ICC cases before the Supreme Court. According to Erwin Griswold, "in at least 85 percent of the cases [they] have been side by side.'>293
Where differences exist, they sometimes involve disputes solely between
the Solicitor General and the ICC. For example, in Henderson v. United
States, 294 the Solicitor General successfully opposed a 1950 ICC rnling
upholding racial segregation on railway dining cars. Solicitor General-ICC
disputes more typically involve squabbles between the ICC and another
governmental department or agency, with the Solicitor General weighing in
on the side of the non-ICC interest. These disputes, which have involved
the Departments of Agriculture, Labor, and Defense, feature such strangely
named cases as United States v. ICC2 95 and United States v. United
States. 296 The Solicitor General's position almost always prevails in these
cases?97
291. Brigman, supra note 104, at 134-41.
292. See supra note 103.
293. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 294 (testimony of Solicitor Geneml Erwin
Griswold).
294. 339 u.s. 816 (1950).
295. 337 u.s. 426 (1949).
296. 417 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd sub nom. National Classification Comm. v. United
States, 430 U.S. 961 (1977). For a discussion of these and other similar cases, see Hcrz, supra note 16;
Stern, supra note 10, at 760-63; Brigman, supra note 104, at 117-41.
297. See Stern, supra note 10, at 761-62; Brigman, supra note 104, at 135-40.

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 306 1994

1994]

INDEPENDENT AGENCY LITIGATION

307

The ICC and Solicitor General have both gained from this arrangement. As stated above, the Solicitor General and the ICC work cooperatively in the vast majority of cases-including cases where other Executive
Branch interests, such as the EPA, oppose the ICC. 298 While the ICC
gained a measure of independence, this arrangement hardly compromised
the prestige of Solicitor General representation. Most significantly, when
conflicts arise, the Solicitor General almost always comes out on top. The
Solicitor General is also able to speak his mind on ICC cases without shutting the courthouse doors to the agency. In one antitrust case, for example,
the Solicitor General bluntly criticized the agency for not making the proper
analysis and not keeping "its eyes open."299 Erwin Griswold's comment
that ICC litigating authority was not "a major difficulty or problem"300 suggests the Solicitor General's apparent contentment with this arrangement.

2.

The FTC

Relations between the FfC and the Solicitor General also suggest that
independent litigating authority improves independent agency representation before the Supreme Court without causing the Solicitor General "major
difficulty." Congress granted the FfC independent litigating authority in
the 1975 Federal Trade Commission Improvements Act. Rooted in the perceived failure of the Department of Justice to represent FfC interests in
court adequately, the Act authorized the FfC to defend agency orders
before the Supreme Court whenever the Solicitor General declined to represent the Commission.301 However, this litigating authority has not undercut
Solicitor General influence. The Solicitor General has proven himself to be

298. In ICC v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 412 U.S. 669
(1973), the EPA sought to challenge an ICC order increasing freight rates. The EPA apparently agreed
with SCRAP's claim that increasing freight rates would lead to a decrease in recyclable materials and,
therefore, would harm the environment. See Davis, supra note 38, at 47-48. After the Solicitor General
joined forces with the ICC in defending the freight increase, the EPA General Counsel wrote a letter to
Solicitor General Robert Bork "requesting permission to submit to the Supreme Court the views of the
Environment Protection Agency • . . [that] the environmental impact statement of the Interstate
Commerce Commission [is insufficient.]" ld. at 48-49 (quoting Appellees' Supplemental Brief at lla,
ICC v. SCRAP, 413 U.S. 917 (1973) (No. 72-535)). Solicitor General Bork rejected this request
because "it appears EPA has no independent regulatory authority in regard to the actions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission ...•" ld. at 49 (quoting Appellees' Supplemental Brief at lOa, SCRAP (No.
72-535)). Bork won both this battle with the EPA and the war over the ICC order, as the Supreme Court
upheld the freight increase in SCRAP. 412 U.S. 669 (1973). For further discussion of this case, see
Davis, supra note 38, at 47-50.
299. Memorandum for the United States at 8, Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 386 U.S. 544
(1967) (No. 638). For further discussion of this case, see Government Litigation in the Supreme Court,
supra note 123, at 1461-62.
300. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 293 (testimony of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold).
301. See supra text accompanying notes 82-87.
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a respected advisor to the FTC on the cert-worthiness of its claims and a
more earnest representative of FTC interests before the Court. 302
This dynamic, in many respects, mirrors ICC-Solicitor General relations. Like the ICC, the Solicitor General and FTC rarely disagree with
each other. In fact, unlike ICC orders which may adversely affect other
governmental interests, the FTC has typically been in sync with White
House preferences these past several years. 303 Conflicts which have arisen
usually involve a case's cert-worthiness and not the substantive outcome
desired by the FTC. With two exceptions, the FTC followed the Solicitor
General's recommendations during this period. 304 The FTC heeded the
Solicitor General sometimes because it agreed with him and sometimes
because it thought the costs of litigating without the Solicitor General's
backing were too high. These costs included the risk of damaging its litigating capital by going to the Court too often, going to the Court without
the benefit of Solicitor General representation, and harming its relationship
with the Solicitor General's office. The FTC's adherence to Solicitor
General advice suggests that the FTC recognized that the added value of
Solictor General representation was so significant that the agency felt
severely constrained in appearing before the Supreme Court without it.
The two cases that the FTC initially pursued without Solicitor General
counsel have also defined the status of Solicitor General-FTC relations.
One case, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 305 concerned the type of
proof necessary to establish a conspiratorial restraint of trade; the other
case, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass 'n, 306 concerned whether a
boycott for greater compensation by court-appointed lawyers should be
considered political speech warranting First Amendment protection. The
Solicitor General, although unwilling to petition the Court on the FTC's
behalf, did not disagree with the FTC on the merits in either case. The
Solicitor General simply thought the cases undeserving of Supreme Court
consideration.307 Despite this belief, the Solicitor General did not seek to
hinder Court consideration by opposing the FTC's petition. In both
instances, to the surprise of the FTC and Solicitor General,308 the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Once certiorari was granted, the Solicitor General
302. Interviews with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4, and Tom Merrill, supra note 5, were
particularly helpful in understanding the present-day dynamic between the Solicitor General's office and
the FrC.
303. See Roger E. Schechter, A Retrospective on the Reagan FTC: Musings on the Role of an
Administrative Agency, 42 ADMIN. L. REv. 489, 489-500 (1990) (describing the Reagan
Administration's ideological domination of the FrC).
304. See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 1 n.1, FrC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (No. 88-1198); Brief for the Federal Trade Commission at 1 n.l, FrC v.
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (No. 84-1809).
305. 476 u.s. 447 {1986).
306. 493 u.s. 411 (1990).
307. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4.
308. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4.
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worked with the FTC in preparing the cases.3°9 Yet, since the FTC had
been granted certiorari by its own rights, it called the shots on presenting
the cases to the Court.
The FTC's lead role apparently did not sit well with the Solicitor
General's office. Because he represents the government in a wide range of
cases, the Solicitor General-even when he agrees with the outcome
desired by a particular agency-frames a case to balance how best to present that case to the Court with his long-range litigation strategy. The
FTC's success in Indiana Federation of Dentists and Superior Court Trial
Lawyers Ass'n allowed the FTC to frame its own arguments.
Consequently, the Solicitor General faced the choice of advocating FTC
positions at the certiorari stage or declining participation in a case and risking a successful independent FTC cert petition. This, according to FTC
officials, is what occurred in FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 310 a case
determining the necessary degree of state supervision of anticompetitive
conduct for private actors to claim immunity from FTC antitrust enforcement. By petitioning the Court for certiorari and then representing the FTC
throughout the litigation, the Solicitor General exercised significant control
in defining the case.311
Pressure to seek certiorari in cases such as Ticor and Indiana
Federation of Dentists does not significantly inconvenience the Solicitor
General. After all, the Solicitor General agrees with the agency on the merits in these cases but decides not to seek certiorari. The FTC experience
suggests that such cases occur few and far between. Moreover, were the
Solicitor General and FTC unable to come to terms over the government's
position, the Solicitor General would remain free to file a supplemental
brief explaining his views. In the end, the Solicitor General-FTC experience has been successful. Although the dynamic is more complex, the prestige and influence of the Solicitor General remain high. That the FTC
almost always decides on its own to do what the Solicitor General recommends suggests that the Solicitor General has gained in persuasive power
what he has lost in statutory authority.

3.

The FEC

The limited FEC experience tells a far different story. In Buckley v.
Valeo, 312 the Department of Justice and FEC fought over the Commission's
very existence. The dispute centered on Congress' decision to split the
309. See Brief for the Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
(1986) (No. 84-1809); Brief for the Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990) (No. 88-1198).
310. 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992). Department of Justice officials do not necessarily subscribe to this
accounting. See supra note 106.
311. See Brief for Federal Trade Commission, FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 112 S. Ct. 2169 (1992)
(No. 91-72).
312. 425 u.s. 946 (1976).
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power to appoint FEC commissioners between Congress and the President.
Attorney General Edward Levi thought that this mixed-appointment scheme
was unconstitutional and that the Department of Justice had no obligation to
consider FEC interests since "the Commission is an agency dominated by
Congress."313 FEC Chairman Tom Curtis strongly disputed Levi's conclusions. Although the FEC was statutorily empowered to represent itself
before the Supreme Court,314 Curtis pleaded with the Attorney General to
provide "a spirited and wholehearted defense of this legislation"315 and
"state[d] as forcefully" as he possibly could that the Attorney General's
position was "dangerously wrong."316 Indeed, Curtis complained both to
the White House and to congressional leadership about Levi's handling of
the case.317 Curtis' efforts to strongarm the Department of Justice did not
succeed. The Department of Justice and FEC f:tled separate briefs before
the Supreme Court on this question; 318 the Department of Justice position
prevailed, forcing a drastic reworking of FEC statutory responsibilities.319
Without independent litigating authority, the FEC would not have had
its views represented in court. In plain terms, the interests of both the
Attorney General (who could advocate his position without fear of provoking political reprisals in Congress) and the FEC (which could have representation as a party in the case) were served by dual representation. The
eventual repudiation of the FEC' s position does not undermine this conclusion-as the saying goes, it is better to have litigated and lost than never to
have litigated at all. Indeed, the feud between Curtis and Levi in part

313. Letter from Edward H. Levi, Attorney General, to Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal
Election Commission (June 12, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 125.
314. 2 U.S.C. §§ 437e(f)(4), 437d(a)(6), (b) (1988); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9010(a), 9040(a) (1988).
315.
Attorney
316.
Attorney

Letter from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to Edward H. Levi,
General (May 27, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 121.
Letter from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to Edward H. Levi,
General (June 5, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 122.

317. See Letter from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to President
Gerald R. Ford (June 9, 1975), reprinted in Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 124-25; Letter
from Thomas B. Curtis, Chainnan, Federal Election Commission, to James G. Abourezk, Chninnan,
Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 12, 1975), reprinted in
Representation Hearings, supra note 156, at 130.
318. See Brief of the Federal Election Commission at 6, Buckley v. Valeo, 425 U.S. 946 (1976)
(No. 75-436) ("This brief defends the legitimacy of the means chosen by Congress to establish the
Federal Election Commission (the method of appointment) ... [because] the Constitution confers upon
the Congress broad and pervasive responsibilities in relation to the federal electoral process ••.•"); Brief
for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Buckley (No. 75436) ('Tf]he grant of enforcement powers to the Federal Election Commission is unconstitutional.••.
Most of its members are appointed by Congress .... Just as the executive branch cannot make the laws,
so Congress (or its delegate, the Commission) cannot enforce them.").
319. Sections 437c(f)(4) and 437d(a)(6) and (b) were modified by the Federal Election Campaign
Act, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), and §§ 9010(a) and 9040(a) were modified by the
Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 563.
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prompted the establishment of the Office of Senate Legal Counsel to ensure
institutional representation of legislative interests before the Court. 320

* * * *

The experiences of the ICC, FTC, and FEC suggest that grants of litigating authority improve independent agency representation before the
Supreme Court without substantially undermining Solicitor General authority. The fear expressed by Erwin Griswold that extending independent litigating authority to "12 or 15 agencies . . . would seriously affect the
handling of the Government's legal work before the Supreme Court"321 is
unlikely to be realized. Built-in restraints are likely to offset the so-called
"commons problem" of each independent agency overvaluing the importance of its own cases, thereby disregarding the cautionary Solicitor General
and flooding an already overburdened Supreme Court with certiorari
petitions.322
Independent agencies gain a good deal from Solicitor General representation. The Solicitor General wins roughly three fourths of his cases
because of his care in selecting cases,323 his experience in presenting them,
and his reputation before the Supreme Court. Independent agencies recognize that victory is less likely without the Solicitor General and that maintaining good relations with this powerful advocate is critically important. 324
Consequently, when the Solicitor General recommends against seeking certiorari, independent agency counsel will likely listen. The FTC's decision
to seek certiorari on its own only twice in more than a decade exemplifies
independent agency self-restraint and suggests that fears of a Supreme
Court litigation explosion are exaggerated.
When conflicts between the Solicitor General and independent agencies do arise, however, the power to go it alone can be critically important
to independent agencies. In Buckley v. Valeo, for example, independent
litigating authority enabled the FEC to fight for its institutional life. The
Solicitor General is not ill-served by this arrangement Without the hindrance of competing independent agency interests, he may be better able to
advance his favored position. Other times, in order to retain control of a
case, he will feel compelled to heed independent agency wishes. On balance, especially since independent agencies are desirous of his counsel and
320. Interview with Mort Rosenberg, supra note 6. The FEC continues to make use of its selfrepresentation authority. In 1993, for example, the Commission unsuccessfuily petitioned the Court in a
dispute with Lyndon LaRouche. See Brief for the Federal Election Commission in Support of
Certiorari, FEC v. LaRouche, 114 S. Ct 550 (1993) (No. 93-519).
321. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 293-94 (testimony of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold).
322. Interview with Tom Merrill, supra note 5; Interview with Ken Geiler, supra note 5; Interview
with Ernie Eisenstadt, supra note 4.
323. See SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 126-30 (focusing on Solicitor General Griswold), 145-50.
324. For an argument that independent agency counsel may be nearly as good and in some cases
better than their counterparts in the Solicitor General's office, see Lochner, supra note 176, at 572-73.
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solicitous of his recommendations, the Solicitor General's influence would
not be significantly reduced under FTC-type hybrid arrangements.
The real question seems to be one of power. If independent agencies
should be limited in their ability to reach conclusions at odds with the
Executive Branch, then centralizing litigating authority within the
Department of Justice seems appropriate. If independent agencies are to
have an independent voice, avoiding the risk of suppressing that voice outweighs confronting the unproven and quite speculative risk that Solicitor
General authority will be undermined through a hybrid litigation scheme.

C.

The Solicitor General as Protector of the Supreme Court

Centralizing government litigating authority before the Supreme Court
involves more than the question of whom the Solicitor General represents
and how well he represents them. It also concerns the needs of the Supreme
Court. Proponents of centralization speak both of fears that the Court is illequipped to resolve disputes involving multiple governmental presentations
and the valuable screening function the Solicitor General performs for the
Court by controlling the filing of certiorari petitions. These arguments for
centralization are forceful. Undoubtedly, centralized control of government
litigation simplifies the Court's task of deciding whether to hear a case and
determining whether the government's position is correct Otherwise, the
Court would sometimes have to choose between opposing governmental
assessments of a case's cert-worthiness and merits. Fears of decentralization are nevertheless overstated. The Supreme Court is quite capable of
managing intragovernmental disputes. The screening function performed
by the Solicitor General, moreover, is not contingent on plenary Solicitor
General control over governmental litigation.
1.

lntragovemmental Disputes Before the Supreme Court

Agency counsel, Department of Justice officials, Supreme Court
Justices, and members of Congress join the Solicitor General in proclaiming
that it is certainly unbecoming and quite possibly destructive to have conflicting governmental interests presented before the Supreme Court. Their
argument is typically not about some constitutional demand that the unitary
executive speak as one voice for all of government before the Court325 The
argument, instead, focuses on the difficulty that the Court would have in
325. Some advocates of Department of Justice centralization do claim that the Executive Branch is
''unitary" and, therefore, that it needs to speak in a single voice. See The Attorney Geneml's Role as
Chief Litigator, supra note 49. At the same time, many proponents of the "unitary executive" pay little
attention to the Department of Justice centralization issue. See, e.g., DouGLAS W. KMmc, THB
ArroRNEY GENERAL's LAWYER: INsiDE THE MEESE Jusnca DEPARTMENT 47-68 (1992) (omitting the
issue of Department of Justice centralization from his otherwise excellent discussion of how the
President asserts power over the Executive Branch).

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 312 1994

1994]

INDEPENDENT AGENCY LITIGATION

313

sorting out such conflicts and in comprehending governmental arguments
made by lawyers outside the Solicitor General's control.
The pervasiveness of this belief is nearly overwhelming. One general
counsel endorsed centralization before the Supreme Court because
"[w]ithout coordination ... the Court might well be faced with conflicting
or even diametrically opposed views of different branches of Government
on specific questions, which would be intolerable."326 An Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum suggested that the Solicitor General "protects the
Court" in presenting "a single, coherent position."327 Solicitors General
agree with this assessment, arguing that multiple independent agency
presentations on a single legal issue "would border on the chaotic."328
Supreme Court Justices, too, support a unified governmental presentation.
In response to a congressional inquiry regarding the consequences of
extending to the SEC the right to petition the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Warren Burger expressed ''the unanimous view of the Justices that it would
be unwise to dilute the authority of the Solicitor General as to Supreme
Court jurisdiction in cases arising within the Executive Branch and
independent agencies."329 Individual Justices have also complained at oral
argument about independent agency cases where the Solicitor General does
not present a unified governmental position. 330
Although Justices may prefer a cleaner, unified government presentation over the more complex and chaotic litigation that could result from
independent agency litigating authority, the suggestion that the Supreme
Court is somehow ill-equipped to face this hydra is a bit surprising.
Independent agencies and the Department of Justice often air intragovemmental conflicts before lower federal courts of appeals.331 No one, however, has endorsed centralized litigating authority to spare federal appellate
court judges the confusion of conflicting governmental presentations in
326. Stem, supra note 3, at 217 (quoting anonymous General Counsel).
327. Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138, at 230-31.
328. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 279 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold).
329. Letter from Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United States, to John E. Moss, Chairman,
House Subcommittee on Commerce and Fmance (Nov. 9, 1971) [hereinafter Letter from Chief Justice
Burger to Congressman Moss], reprinted in Study of the Securities Industry: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 1809-10 (1971).
330. Justice Felix Frankfurter complained in the St. Regis case: "How do you expect us to decide
this matter if you can't even get an agreement inside the Justice Department?" Brigman, supra note
104, at 155 (quoting Justice Frankfurter). For further discussion of St. Regis, see supra text
accompanying notes 79-81.
331. Numerous examples of these cases can be found in Herz, supra note 16. Some of these cases
include: United States v. FDIC, 881 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1989); Confederated Tribes and Bands of
Yakima Indian Nation v. FERC, 746 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1984) (involving a suit brought by the National
Marine Fisheries Service and others against the FERC); United States v. Federal Maritime Cornrn'n, 694
F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982); United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Civil
Aeronautics Bd., 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also supra text accompanying notes 203-08
(discussing Chicago Mercantile Exchange v. SEC).
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their courts. It is unlikely that Supreme Court Justices would be less able to
deal with such conflicts.
The Supreme Court, in fact, has never suggested that it could not
effectively resolve multiple government presentations. The record supports
just the opposite: the Supreme Court is comfortably resigned to adjudicating dual government presentations. Having had a considerable number of
intragovernmental disputes presented before it, the Supreme Court is clearly
familiar with and hardly phased by this practice. The few statements of
disapproval found in oral argument transcripts are of little significance; the
Court has described this practice as "not a rarity."332
Supreme Court acquiescence to dual government representation
extends not just to independent agencies but to cases involving competing
interests within the Executive Branch. In TVA v. Hill, the Solicitor General
appended to his brief supporting TVA efforts to construct the Tellico Dam a
Department of Interior memorandum claiming that Endangered Species Act
protection of the snail darter prohibited the dam's construction.333 In
Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, a brief filed on behalf
of the EEOC, the Office of Personnel Management, and the Departments of
Labor and Defeuse raised concerns about the Massachusetts' veterans' preference scheme that were neglected by the Solicitor General.334 A more
striking example appeared in Bob Jones University v. United States, where
the Solicitor General successfully requested that the Court appoint counsel
to represent the Treasury Department's position denying tax breaks to racist
schools while the Department of Justice separately argued that, until
Congress passed specific legislation on the issue, racist schools were entitled to tax breaks.335 The Court's compliance with this unorthodox request,
as well as its willingness to allow intraexecutive disputes to be presented to
it in Hill aud Feeney, suggest that the Court recognizes that the Executive
Branch sometimes behaves more like a conglomeration of divergent and
occasionally antagonistic concerns than as a unitary voice.
The Court, nevertheless, has not spoken definitively on the issue of
whether suits can be maintained between different parts of the Executive
Branch-for instance, the EPA bringing an enforcement action against the
Department of Energy.336 Bob Jones University, Feeney, and Hill all
332. Oral Argument Transcript at 33, Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (No. 761701).
333. See Brief for the Petitioner at 1a-13a, Appendix: Views of the Secretary of the Interior, Hill
(No. 76-1701).
334. See Motion for Leave to File and Brief of the Office of Personnel Management, the United
States Department of Defense, the United States Department of Labor, and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission as Amici Curiae, Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (No. 78233).
335. See supra text accompanying notes 110-13.
336. See generally Herz, supra note 16; Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA Sue Other Federal
Agencies?, 17 EcoLOGY L.Q. 317 (1990).
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involved a "nongovernmental 'real party in interest' " 337 who could separately maintain the lawsuit against the principal governmental defendant. A
more vivid example of an intraexecutive dispute is United States v.
Nixon. 338 In opposing executive-controlled efforts by the special prosecutor to gain access to the Nixon tapes,339 the President's counsel claimed that
"[t]his entire dispute, between two entities within the executive branch" is
nonjusticiable because Article IT of the Constitution vests ''ultimate authority over all executive branch decisions ... in the President."340 While recognizing that the dispute was indeed between a subordinate and superior
officer of the Executive Branch (suggesting that Nixon could fire Leon
Jaworski just as he fired Archibald Cox), the Court nonetheless ruled
against Nixon. Noting the presence of "concrete adverseness,"341 the Court
stated that "[t]he mere assertion of a claim of an 'intra-branch dispute,'
without more, has never operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability
does not depend on such a surface inquiry."342 It is unclear whether the
Court interpreted Nixon to embrace a "real party in interest'' standard or,
instead, simply insisted that "the issues were of the sort which are traditionally justiciable and ... the setting assured concrete adverseness."343
The Court's handling of intraexecutive disputes suggests that the Court
does not demand that the Executive Branch act as a singular entity. This
recognition of a multidimensional government is quite apparent in the case
of independent agencies. Disputes between the Solicitor General and
independent agencies can sometimes be seen in certiorari petitions, briefs,
and oral arguments. In fact, the Court has even chided the Solicitor General
in some of its opinions for not reporting conflicting government views. In
Connecticut v. Teal, Justice Brennan's majority opinion took note of the
fact that the EEOC, "which shares responsibility [with the Department of
337. Proposed Tax Assessment Against the United States Postal Service, I Op. Off. Legal Counsel
79, 83 (1977) (assessing the justiciability of a dispute between the Postal Service and the IRS). The
Reagan Administration likewise endorsed this "real party iu interest" standard in opposing EPA
enforcement actions against another federal agency. See Memorandum from John M. Harmon,
Assistant Attorney General, to Michael J. Egan, Associate Attorney General 5-8 (June 23, 1978),
reprinted in Compliance Hearing, supra note 66, at 668, 672-75. The Bush Administration, not
surprisingly, also endorsed this real party in interest standard. See Memorandum of Understanding on
Civil Enforcement Between the Justice Department and the Environmental Protection Agency, supra
note 68.
338. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). For a commentary on the justiciability of Nixon, see Philip B. Kurland,
United States v. Nixon: Who Killed Cock Robin?, 22 UCLA L. REv. 68, 71-72 (1974).
339. The Nixon litigation, of course, predated the Ethics in Goverrunent Act's creation of
independent counsels insulated from the Executive Branch. The independence of special prosecutor
Leon Jaworski, who handled the Nixon litigation, hinged on regulations promulgated (and repealable) by
the Attorney General. See Briefforthe United States at 17, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974)
(No. 73-1766) (arguing that such regulations ensured a "concrete controversy'').
340. Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States at
28, Nixon (No. 73-1766).
341. 418 U.S. at 697 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
342. Id. at 693.
343. Herz, supra note 16, at 969.

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 315 1994

316

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 82:255

Justice] for federal enforcement of Title VII"344 declined to join the
Department of Justice's brief. In Sheet Metal Workers, Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion likewise signalled his recognition that the Solicitor
General's office had de facto overruled the EEOC, noting that "throughout
this litigation, [the EEOC] joined the other plaintiffs in asking the courts to
order [the] numerical goals [it now opposes]."345
The Court also recognizes the propriety of lawsuits launched by
independent agencies against the Executive Branch and vice versa.
Lawsuits between the Federal Power Commission and the Department of
Interior,346 the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Department of
Agriculture, 347 the Postal Service and the Postal Rate Commission, 348 the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Department of Justice,349 and other
combinations have been found justiciable.350 The best known of these
cases is United States v. ICC, 351 a 1949 case concerning a Department of
Justice challenge to the ICC's rejection of a Department of Army complaint
against unreasonable railroad rates. The ICC sought to have the case dismissed because "the United States was both plaintiff and defendant and
[the case,] therefore, was one presenting no actual case or controversy."352
The Department of Justice attacked this intragovemmental fiction, arguing
that "some determinations made by the Commission, an independent governmental agency, will be regarded as erroneous by the highest legal
officers of the Govemment."353 In other words, since independent agencies
are free to make decisions at odds with the Executive Branch, the
Department of Justice reasoned that it is improper to invoke an intragovemmental fiction to shield those decisions from the courts. "[S]ubstance, not
form, is controlling."354 The Supreme Court agreed, holding that "courts
must look behind the names that symbolize the parties to determine whether
a justiciable case or controversy is presented."355
The Court could not have held otherwise without contradicting the
1935 Humphrey's Executor 56 decision that affirmed the constitutionality of
344. 457 U.S. 440, 451 n.ll (1982).
345. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 444 n.24 (1986).
346. See Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); United States ex rei Chapman v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
347. Secretary of Agric. v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954).
348. Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. United States Postal Serv., 986 F.2d 509 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
349. See, e.g., United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974). These decisions are both cited in Nixon to support
the Court's conclusion that Nixon is justiciable. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974).
350. Most of the examples listed above and several others are mentioned in Herz, supra note 16.
351. 337 u.s. 426 (1949).
352. Brief for the Interstate Commerce Commission at 21, United States v. lCC, 337 U.S. 426
(1949) (No. 330).
353. Brief for the United States at 26, United States v. ICC (No. 330) (emphasis added).
354. /d. at 11.
355. United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. at 430.
356. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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independent regulatory agencies. In that case, the Court had validated
administrative decisionmaking outside complete Executive Branch control
and, with it, the possibility of a truly adversarial policy dispute within the
government. If this intragovernmental dispute were nonjusticiable, one
wonders whether controversies between the legislative and executive
branches over the constitutionality of legislation or between the judiciary
and the executive over the enforcement of subpoenas would be similarly
nonjusticiable.
United States v. ICC, however, is more than the justiciability counterpart to Humphrey's Executor. Its emphasis on "substance, not form" suggests that the Court recognizes that governmental operations are organized
in a seemingly endless variety of shapes and forms. One of the forms validated by the Court was regulation outside the control of the President.
Once the Court legitimized independent agencies, it was to be expected that
the Court would facilitate their independence by approving their participation in litigation. Inevitably, some of that litigation would involve the
Executive Branch. That some of that litigation would occur before the
Supreme Court was also inevitable. The notion that the Court somehow is
poorly served or confused by dual governmental representation is misguided. The Court has invited this dual representation.
2.

The Solicitor General as Gatekeeper

Supporters of Solicitor General control of government Supreme Court
litigation most commonly argue that the Solicitor General's screening of
governmental cases "guard[s] the door to the Supreme Court, to make sure
that only the most important cases are appealed."357 This vision of the
Solicitor General as the Court's erstwhile gatekeeper is so prevalent that a
principal focus of Solicitor General scholarship has been to sort out "the
conflicting obligations of the Solicitor General"358 as "an officer and an
advocate."359 More significantly, Solicitors General, Congress, and the
Supreme Court have all given credence to this gatekeeper function in their
words and deeds. Solicitors General see themselves as "first-line gatekeeper[s]"360 and accordingly defend centralization because "[s]uch
control insures that the government presents to the Supreme Court only
those cases that meet the Court's own exacting standards for review ."361
Under this view, formally embraced by the Carter Justice Department, "as
an officer of the Court," the Solicitor General "protects the Court's docket
357. Jenkins, supra note 184, at 737 (quoting former Deputy Solicitor General Ken Geller).
358. Eric Schnapper so titled his article: "Becket at the Bar-The Conflicting Obligations of the
Solicitor General." Schnapper, supra note 143.
359. Richard Wilkins so titled his article: "An Officer and an Advocate: The Role of the Solicitor
General." Wilkins, supra note 143.
360. McCree, supra note 162, at 341.
361. Exchange Act Hearings, supra note 76, at 278 (statement of Solicitor General Erwin
Griswold).
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by screening the Government's cases and relieving the Court of the burden
of reviewing unmeritorious claims."362
The Solicitor General and Department of Justice preserve power
through this argument and have great incentive to make this claim. That
Congress and the Supreme Court likewise embrace this view is all the more
significant. The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs endorsed
Solicitor General coordination of Supreme Court litigation to ensure that
the Court would not be "overburdened by requests for certiorari filed by the
Government."363 The Supreme Court in 1971 likewise spoke out against
the expansion of independent agency litigating authority, expressing its
unanimous view that "the Solicitor General exercises a highly important
role in the selection of cases to be brought [before the Court] in terms of
the long-range public interest."364 Moreover, in its 1988 Providence
Journal decision, the Court suggested that "[w]ithout the centralization of
the decision whether to seek certiorari, [it] might well be deluged with
petitions from every federal prosecutor, agency, or instrumentality."365
Solicitor General and Supreme Court conduct reveals that both entities
take seriously this gatekeeper role. The Solicitor General seeks certiorari in
roughly five to fifteen percent of the cases presented to him. In the 1984
term, for example, certiorari was sought in only forty-three of the several
hundred cases sent to the Solicitor General by departments, agencies, and
divisions.366 For its part, the Supreme Court follows the Solicitor General's
lead. From 1959-1989, Solicitors General successfully obtained certiorari
in almost seventy percent of the 1294 cases they presented to the Court. 367
Private litigants, in contrast, succeeded in only about five percent of their
cases. 368
As gatekeeper, the Solicitor General surely pays attention to many of
the indicia of cert-worthiness that the Supreme Court has itself identified. 369
The Solicitor General must also balance concerns far removed from the
standard criteria for cert-worthiness, including policy objectives of the
Department of Justice and the White House, desires of affected governmental interests, and the risk of legislative intervention. These competing concerns explain the Solicitor General's unsuccessful efforts to oppose
certiorari in two critical affirmative action cases-Metro Broadcasting and
362. Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138, at 231.
363. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 66. The Governmental Affairs
Committee, however, did recommend that all independent agencies be allowed to "petition the Supreme
Court to review adverse decisions of lower courts." Id. at 66-67.
364. Letter from Chief Justice Burger to Congressman Moss, supra note 329.
365. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 706 (1988).
366. SALOKAR, supra note 121, at 114.
367. Id. at 25.
368. ld.
369. The Court has identified such factors as conflicts among federal courts, conflicts between state
and federal courts, departures from applicable Supreme Court precedents, and important questions of
federal law. See SUP. CT. R. 10.
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Sheet Metal Workers. In each case, the Solicitor General disagreed with the
independent agency's support of affirmative action but feared the backlash
that might ensue if he reversed the agency's position.37 Concerns outside
the Supreme Court's objective criteria might also explain the Solicitor
General's decision to seek certiorari in Ticor rather than let the FfC manage the litigation.371
Solicitors General Fried and Starr should not be faulted for their interjection of political concerns in the handling of these cases. After all, the
Solicitor General must operate within the delegation of authority granted
him by the Attorney General. During the Carter years, that delegation was
quite broad. Attorney General Bell spoke proudly of how he insulated the
Solicitor General from the White House, and his Office of Legal Counsel
issued a memorandum opinion defending Solicitor General independence.372 During the Reagan years, a greater attempt was made to coordinate Solicitor General action with Attorney General preferences. Daily
meetings were scheduled, and Attorney General delegates frequently lobbied the Solicitor General.373 Whatever the scope of the delegation, however, the Solicitor General will be influenced by political concerns.
The Court, undonbtedly, is aware that the Solicitor General exists
within a political culture and that he must be influenced by it. 374 However,
the Solicitor General's frequent appearances before the Court, his need to
preserve good relations with the Court as part of his litigation strategy, and
a sense of duty that many Solicitors General feel towards the Court warrant
some degree of solicitude by the Court towards the Solicitor General. This
solicitude, coupled with the deference the Court accords a coequal branch
of government, supports the preservation of the Solicitor General's gatekeeper function.
The question remains whether the gatekeeper function can be maintained while allowing independent agencies greater litigating authority
before the Court. The answer is yes. The Solicitor General is always free
to express his opinion on a case's cert-worthiness. The Solicitor General's
assessment of a case does not become less persuasive simply because an
independent agency speaks its own voice before the Court. Indeed, as
stated above, Congress could ensure Solicitor General participation at the
certiorari stage by mandating that the Solicitor General be a statutory litigant in all cases involving the government. Alternatively, the Court,
acknowledging that the gatekeeper function supposedly is performed on its

°

370. See supra text accompanying notes 224-31 (discussing Metro Broadcasting), 253-58
(discussing Sheet Metal Workers).
371. See supra text accompanying notes 310-11.
372. See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 47-50; Role of the Solicitor General, supra note 138.
373. See generally FRIED, supra note 7, at 40-44; CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 51-64 (focusing on the
Bob Jones litigation), 81-115, 135-54.
374. For a discussion of the Court's recognition that the Solicitor General changes position when
there is a new president, see supra note 170.
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behalf, may itself ask the Solicitor General to comment on the cert-worthiness of independent agency litigation.375
Nonetheless, allowing independent agencies to petition the Court separately would somewhat diminish the Solicitor General's power since he
could not maintain a veto over independent agency litigation. In certain
instances, however, the Solicitor General used that veto to keep a case out
of court on the merits and not because the case lacked cert-worthiness. 376
Merits-based decisionmaking of this nature is at odds with the gatekeeper
function, namely, to assist the Court in identifying cases worth hearing on
the merits. Consequently, enhanced independent agency litigating authority
better enables the Supreme Court to understand which cases the Solicitor
General opposes on the merits and which cases he opposes for failure to
meet measures of cert-worthiness. In other words, independent litigating
authority may well serve and would be unlikely to hinder the gatekeeper
function performed by the Solicitor General.

* * * *

Centralization arguments rooted in the needs of the Supreme Court are
exaggerated. While centralization does ensure a cleaner presentation of a
smaller number of cases, its benefits are somewhat illusory. The Court is
relatively untroubled by conflicting governmental presentation and Solicitor
General input is not contingent on centralization. However, the costs of
centralization to independent agencies are significant. As Robert Stern
observed some forty years ago:
[When conflict arises,] determination by the judiciary is often more
satisfactory than an effort by the Department of Justice to force its
own views on the disagreeing [independent] agency by refusing to
present the agency's position to the courts. The Attorney General
has no authority to give binding legal advice to the independent
agencies. Only the judiciary has authority to give the conclusive
answer to the question in dispute. 377
This analysis, however, does not address the question of whether there
should be governmental agencies able to reach policy conclusions at odds
with the President. It presupposes that independent agencies are empowered to speak their own voice.

375. The Court now asks the Solicitor General several times each year to provide his views on a
matter before the Court. Interview with Ken Geller, supra note 5. There is no reason to think that nn
alteration in independent agency litigating authority will make the Court less likely to seek Solicitor
General counsel.
376. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Chicago Mercantile Exch. v.
SEC, 496 U.S. 936 (1990); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986).
377. Stem, supra note 10, at 769.
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m
MUSINGS ON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AUTHORITY AND
INDEPENDENT AGENCY AUTONOMY

By creating independent agencies, Congress has sought to insulate
some regulatory decisionmaking from the control of elected government.
Although the President has power to submit budget requests, name the
chairman, and appoint at least some commissioners as well as key staffers,
"[t]he multiple membership of these agencies, with terms expiring at staggered intervals, does tend to serve as a buffer against Presidential control
and direction.' 7378 Limiting presidential control, however, does not mean
that independent agencies are mouthpieces for Congress.379 Indeed, ranking majority and minority leadership of several Senate committees have
proclaimed that the final word on independent agency decisionmaking is to
be spoken by Article ill judges. A joint letter to President Carter expressed
this sentiment, arguing that "in exercising the quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative authority which Congress had delegated to the agencies, agency
actions shall not be subject to review or modification by either Congress or
the Executive; only the courts may review final agency actions."380
Independent agencies, according to Congress, are supposed to reach
policy determinations according to their own dictates. In these circumstances, where Congress wants a voice within government freed from presidential control, grants of independent litigating authority are perfectly
sensible. Because these independent agencies, on occasion, will find themselves at odds with the White House, the Department of Justice should be
able neither to compel these agencies to advocate in court a position with
which they disagree nor to foreclose their access to the Supreme Court by
refusing to seek certiorari on their behalf.
Congress has not followed its own design, however. Rather than
empower independent agencies with independent litigating authority,
Congress has crafted an extraordinarily incoherent system of unpredictably
varying degrees of litigating authority. Some agencies are virtually
independent; others entirely dependent; and most somewhere in the middle. 381 Specific political circumstances, not cohesive thinking about the

378. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 75.
379. Independent agencies are sometimes depicted as "arm[s] of Congress." ld. at 31. As one
Senator put it: '"The commissions, if I may risk oversimplification, are ours." ld. (quoting Senator
Hart).
380. Letter from Bipartisan Senate Leadership to President Jimmy Carter 3 (Dec. 16. 1977),
reprinted in Role of OMB in Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 170, 172 (1981); see also Olson,
supra note 10, at 86 (discussing the view that courts should review agency actions).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 21-37.
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attributes of independent agency autonomy, explain this patchwork
structure.382
To expect that Congress would have a coherent vision of the structure
and purposes of independent agencies is perhaps to expect the impossible.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Operations admitted as much, casually noting that "[a] decision on structure is after all a political issue, very
much influenced by the prevailing political situation. And that situation can
neither be quantified nor predicted."383 It is not surprising that "random
selection"384 may explain Congress' choice of an independent over an executive format. The confluence of oversight committee preferences, interest
group pressures, and legislative-executive relations inevitably yields different organizational structures. In the end, the only certainty about independent agencies is that they are multimember bodies headed by individuals who
cannot be appointed or removed "at will" by the President.
Congress' failure to articulate why it sometimes prefers the independent agency model has resulted in allocations of authority with little rhyme
and less reason. 385 This incoherency is present with respect to concerns of
both subject matter authority and structure. On matters of substance, for
example, regulation of the banking industry, antitrust enforcement, and
employment discrimination prosecutions are concurrently managed by both
the executive and independent agencies.386 On the matters of structure,
some independent agencies are free of, and others very much dependent on,
the Department of Justice and the Office of Management and Budget.
The haphazard nature of independent litigating authority is certainly
expected.387 Since the independent agency structure is far from preordained,388 Congress' decision to make some independent agencies more
dependent on the Executive Branch than others seems an acceptable state of
affairs. Nonetheless, there is something unsettling about Department of
Justice control of independent agency litigating authority. Granted,
Congress may confine the substance and scope of independent agency
action either by limiting the sweep of independent agency jurisdiction or by
382. See supra text accompanying notes 82-94 (discussing reasons why Congress approved FfC
authority to represent itself before the Supreme Court but refused to give similar power to the SEC).
383. STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, supra note 60, at 79.
384. Paul R. Verkuil, The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies, 1988 DuKB L.J. 257, 258.
385. See Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 16, at 72-73; Verkuil, supra note 384, at 25859.
386. See Miller, Independent Agencies, supra note 16, at 72-73.
387. This haphazard nature proves fatal for those who demand that "[d]eviations from the classical
model of separation of powers ... be justified by sufficiently compelling considerations of policy." /d.
at 72.
388. The first independent agency, the ICC, was not designed to be independent. Instead,
Democrats in Congress apparently altered the ICC structu~ in response to the pending presidentinl
inauguration of Republican railroad lawyer Benjamin Harrison. Id. at 75. This legislative history
supports the conclusion that "the concept of the independent commission arose from a desire by
Congress to insulate the agency from Presidential influence." STUDY oN Fso£RAL RsoULATION, supra
note 60, at 28.
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empowering the President with great authority to influence independent
agency decisionmaking. Yet, once the initial policy decision is made, the
agency should be free to defend its position. If not, limits on litigating
authority may well force an independent agency to sit idly by and watch the
Department of Justice abandon the agency's publicly stated position. This
is precisely what happened to the SEC in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange
litigation, to the FCC in League of Women Voters, and to the EEOC in
Sheet Metal Workers. 389
The prospect of Department of Justice domination of independent
agency decisionmaking does not seem to trouble Congress. Some
independent agencies have no litigating authority. Moreover, with only
three clear exceptions,39 Congress has left it to the Solicitor General to
represent independent agency interests before the Supreme Court. If
Congress truly intends independent agencies to be able to reach policy decisions at odds with the White House, the current arrangement is at best
counterproductive. The Solicitor General's loyalty is first owed to the
President and Attorney General and then to the affected agencies. 391
Perhaps Congress should not be judged too harshly for giving an
Executive Branch official, and not the courts, the last word in reviewing
independent agency decisionmaking. After all, bureaucratic folklore treats
the Solicitor General as somehow removed from the confmes of White
House politics. However, Congress' jerry-rigged approach to independent
litigating authority before the lower federal courts suggests a more pervasive legislative insensitivity to whether independent agencies speak their
own voice in court.
Congress' insensitivity to the independent litigating issue, however,
does not answer the question of whether centralization or decentralization
of litigating authority is good public policy. The argument for centralization, at least as applied to executive departments and agencies, is persuasive. Centralization of litigating authority within the Department of Justice
provides a chief mechanism by which the Executive Branch can coordinate
governmental decisionmaking. With most government policy subject to
court challenge, Department of Justice control over litigation is a fundamental attribute of presidential power. Were Congress to empower all governmental entities with independent litigating authority, presidential control
of the Executive Branch would suffer a serious, perhaps fatal, blow. As the
Attorney General has noted, there is a "responsibility to ensure that the
interests of the United States as a whole, as articulated by the Executive,

°

389. See supra text accompanying notes 203-09 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange), 211-16 (League
of Women Voters), 253-58 (Sheet Metal Workers).
390. These exceptions are the ICC, FTC and FEC. See supra Part II.B.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 166-69.
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are given a paramount position over potentially conflicting interests
between subordinate segments of the government."392
Centralization is about much more than the preservation of presidential
authority. The President is accountable to a national electorate; administrative agencies are "unelected, bureaucratic, [and] fragmented." 393 By
reducing intragovernmental disputes, centralization is also more likely to
result in more coordinated, more efficient policymaking. 394 Centralization
of litigating authority is not without its pitfalls, however. An overly ambitious President could frustrate legislative desires through the power to
control all government litigation.
Congress, of course, does not need to respond to such presidential
intrusiveness through exemptions to Department of Justice litigating authority. Statutes can be made more specific. Funding bans can limit specified
executive initiatives. Appropriations can be cut to disfavored agencies. In
the case of executive departments and agencies, these types of legislative
controls should be preferred to limitations on Department of Justice litigating authority. The conferral of independent litigating authority to sub-units
within the Executive Branch enables and encourages executive agencies
and departments to stake out a policy position at odds with the President's.
Statutory controls do not present this danger. Congress is the supreme lawmaking branch and it is, therefore, appropriate that the President live within
the policymaking confines of legislative delegations. 395 Substantive legislative directives, therefore, must be heeded by the President. Yet, once
Congress has granted discretion to the Executive Branch to put into place
broadly phrased legislative mandates, it is appropriate that some centralizing force under the President's direct control define the meaning of such
legislative delegations.
Congress would be well served by systematically thinking through the
independent litigating authority issue. In the end, it may prefer the current
system where independent agency decisionmaking can be overturned by the
Executive Branch. Alternatively, it may prefer to draw cleaner lines separating independent agencies from executive entities. Whatever conclusion
it reaches, however, Congress should not place the Solicitor General in too
exalted a position. If an independent agency voice is to be spoken, Solicitor
General control can and should be limited. Otherwise, the Solicitor General
392. The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator, supra note 49, at 54 (emphasis added).
393. Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 519, 530 (1987); see also Thomas 0.
McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36 AM. U. L. REv. 443, 449
(1987).
394. See McGarity, supra note 393, at 447-48; The Attorney General's Role as Chief Litigator,
supra note 49, at 54.
395. See generally Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree:
Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv.
203, 228-42 (1987).
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will sometimes thwart that voice. It is this aspect of Solicitor General
control that is in need of repair. 396
Although change is necessary, it need not require a diminution of
Solicitor General control in favor of independent agency autonomy. The
subordination of independent agency decisionmaking to Executive Branch
control offers another type of change. The limited and unsuccessful efforts
of some Reagan and Bush Administration officials to push the unitariness
banner,397 however, reveal that subordinating independent agencies to a
unitary executive is an idea whose time is yet to come.
With that bit of political reality in mind, this Article has focused on the
day-to-day interchanges between the Solicitor General and the independent
agencies. The solution proposed in this Article is to allow independent
agency self-representation whenever the Solicitor General is unwilling to
advocate the agency's interests. This solution, as the FTC experience
reveals, would greatly benefit independent agencies with little harm to the
Solicitor General. Moreover, especially if Congress makes the Solicitor
General a statutory litigant in all cases involving the government, this
hybrid model would enable the Supreme Court to continue reaping the benefits of Solicitor General counsel.
The hybrid model is also sensitive to the culture of expectations surrounding Solicitor General advocacy. Congress, hesitant to extend
independent litigating authority beyond federal courts of appeals, clearly
prefers a unitary governmental voice before the Supreme Court. In
exchange for this grant of authority, however, Congress expects that the
Solicitor General will be a responsible gatekeeper and an "objective advocate" who seriously considers the merits of independent agency arguments.
Most Solicitors General, like Congress, seem comfortable with this mixed
approach. Certiorari is more likely to be sought in independent agency
cases than in cases involving purely executive offices. The flagging of
independent agency-Solicitor General disagreements in briefs and certiorari
petitions likewise is common. Finally, independent agencies are sometimes
allowed to separately advance their views to the Court. These accommodations reveal a willingness on the part of most Solicitors General to give up
some unitariness in independent agency cases.
The hybrid model, moreover, is sensitive to the twin and somewhat
contradictory goals of unitariness and independence. First, the hybrid
model does not undermine Solicitor General authority. Under it, the
Solicitor General is the presumptive government advocate before the
Supreme Court. As such, independent agencies recognizing the benefits of
396. For this reason, I reject Todd Lochner's proposal to preserve the Solicitor General's absolute
control over certiorari petitions and government advocacy before the Court but to allow independent
agencies an ''unqualified right to file an amicus brief in any case iu which its interests were directly
affected." Lochner, supra note 176, at 580.
397. See generally Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the lAw, supra note 1.
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Solicitor General representation would typically heed Solicitor General recommendations. At the same time, knowing that an independent agency
may seek self-representation, the Solicitor General would be attentive to
independent agency desires in order to maximize control of government
litigation. Second, when conflicts emerge between the Solicitor General
and independent agencies, the hybrid model does not stifle the interests of
either advocate. Independent agencies gain the right to ensure that their
views are fairly presented to the Court. The Solicitor General, while no
longer possessing the authority to influence the Court's agenda by denying
a forum to disfavored independent agency litigants, could nonetheless participate as a statutory litigant in all independent agency cases. Additionally,
by being free of the pressure to sometimes advocate independent agency
positions as a matter of comity, the Solicitor General may gain from this
arrangement.
The hybrid model would be an improvement, but it is far from a panacea. In some instances, a singular governmental position should be
presented to the Court. For example, statutes that cut across all governmental operations, such as the Freedom of Information Act, should not be subject to myriad conflicting interpretations. In other instances, the risk that an
independent agency might be subject to interest group capture may prove so
acute that Solicitor General control appears the lesser of two evils. To take
into account the possibility that plenary Solicitor General control over
independent agency litigation is sometimes sensible, the hybrid model must
give way when a convincing case can be made for Executive Branch
control. Furthermore, although responsive to instances where the Solicitor
General thwarts independent agency prerogatives, the hybrid model cannot
prevent a renegade independent agency from either routinely disregarding
Solicitor General input or insistently seeking certiorari after each appellate
court defeat. This risk, however, does not warrant Solicitor General control
of independent agency litigation.
Between the dangers of too strong a Solicitor General or too persistent
an independent agency there is no choice. A principal rationale for
independent agencies is to make policy judgments free of executive control.
Consequently, while an overly aggressive independent agency may prove a
nuisance to an already overburdened Supreme Court, a Solicitor General
who is too strong poses a real threat to the structural division between
independent agencies and the Executive Branch. Unless and until the purposes. of independent agency autonomy change, the Solicitor General
should not control independent agency litigation. To argue otherwise, that
the Solicitor General should maintain dominion over independent agency
litigation, is to argue against the propriety of independent agencies being
truly independent; as this Article demonstrates, unitariness is the only
mooring which supports Solicitor General control of independent agency
litigation.

HeinOnline -- 82 Cal L. Rev. 326 1994

1994]

INDEPENDENT AGENCY LITIGATION

327

Unitariness, of course, is not without appeal. But unitariness cannot be
reconciled with independent agency autonomy. Although unitariness and
independence may peacefully coexist under the hybrid model, unitariness
nonetheless will occasionally give way to dual governmental presentations.
For those who find dual governmental presentations before the Supreme
Court unseemly and inappropriate, the current model of Solicitor General
control is generally satisfactory. The issue of dual presentations before
lower federal courts, however, must also be confronted. Supporters of a
unitary Solicitor General should oppose this system of independent agency
autonomy before lower courts as well. Since unitariness is the only value
which supports Solicitor General control of independent agency litigation,
there is no reason to think it somehow matters less in lower court adjudication where nearly all independent agency litigation is resolved.
Proponents of the current scheme cannot have it both ways.
Unitariness before the Supreme Court suggests unitariness before all courts.
Independence before lower federal courts implies the right to speak one's
voice before the Supreme Court. Unitariness and independence are values
in tension. A choice between values must be made. That choice, whatever
it may be, requires change.
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